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Abstract
This thesis explores the history of sodomy as it has been conceptualized through the
creation and enforcement of the Texas sodomy statutes between 1860 and 1973. In analyzing
state court cases, legislative records, and newspaper accounts, I argue that the evolution of the
concept of sodomy from its inception as a broad criminal category in the 1860 Texas sodomy
statute to its more-narrow conceptualization by Texas legislators as a behavioral characteristic of
homosexual status in the 1973 homosexual conduct statute was a political and historically
contingent process. This process was political firstly in that it allowed for the construction of
political identities based on bodily practices, and secondly in that shifting conceptualizations of
sodomy were strategically utilized by local law enforcement, judges, and state lawmakers in
Texas in order to exert power and maintain control over different groups of people between 1860
and 1973. The politicization of sexual behavior and human bodies in Texas by way of the state’s
1860 and 1943 sodomy statutes was made possible through not just the ambiguity of sodomy,
which I posit as part of a legacy of confusion surrounding sodomy, but also through a dualistic
conceptualization of sodomy adopted in the legislature, at crime scenes, and in court rooms
across the state: On one hand, sodomy was conceived as an act. On the other hand, sodomy was
also conceived as a behavior—often attributed to a specific type of person who was prone to
habitually committing acts of sodomy—or more specifically, as an identity. The distinction
between an act of sodomy and sodomitical status is important because, unlike the former, the
latter is connected to a process of Othering, producing what I call the sodomitical Other.
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1. Sodomy in History and the Law: An Introduction
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story
of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become.
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law

In the early morning hours of June 29, 2009 in El Paso, Texas, a police officer threatened
a gay couple with a citation for homosexual conduct after they kissed each other inside a local
restaurant. The couple was part of a group of five men who decided to dine at Chico’s Tacos,
which, despite its reputation as a popular late-night stop for partiers and night owls, was dubbed
a “family” restaurant by one of the security guards who was there that night. The “Chico’s Five,”
as they would later be named by El Paso Times reporter Daniel Borunda, were directed to leave
the restaurant after the same security guard witnessed the couple kissing. When the group
refused, both the guard and one of the men from the group began making calls to 911. When the
police finally arrived on the scene, they backed the Chico’s security guards and threatened the
young men with a citation. Not only was the police officer’s understanding of the Texas
homosexual conduct statute incorrect—the statute had no proscription against kissing—but he
also failed to take into consideration two important factors that should have affected his action.
First and foremost, the United States Supreme Court had ruled six years earlier in Lawrence v.
Texas (2003) that the Texas homosexual conduct statute was unconstitutional. The officer later
pleaded ignorance about the Supreme Court ruling by bringing attention to the fact that the
homosexual conduct statute was still in the Texas penal code—it was, and it still is today.
Secondly, the police officer was also seemingly ignorant of the fact that the city of El Paso had
1

passed an ordinance that protected individuals against public discrimination based on sexual
orientation the same year as the decision in Lawrence. There are no reports of a straight couple
being kicked out of Chico’s Tacos for kissing, nor are there any reports of a straight couple being
threatened with a citation for doing so.1
Despite both the City of El Paso’s anti-discrimination ordinance and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), lesbians and gay men are still discriminated against
through policy and law. El Paso voters passed a ballot initiative that discontinued city-funded
benefits for unmarried partners of city employees one year after the Chico’s Five incident. In the
two years that followed, a religiously, morally, and legally charged battle ensued. The
conservative-backed initiative was introduced in response to El Paso’s city council voting the
controversial measure of city benefits into effect in August of 2009. Supporters of the initiative,
led by local pastor Tom Brown, claimed that the measure “sends the message that the city
approves of homosexuality and of heterosexual couples living out of wedlock.”2 The controversy
of the situation was perpetuated by a series of events that included the city council’s decision to
restore the liberal measure on June 14, 2011, an attempt led by Pastor Brown to recall the city’s
mayor and two city representatives, and finally, the Texas Supreme Court ending the recall effort
in December of 2012.
The same threat of discrimination, stigmatization, and even arrest for lesbians and gay
men still remains in other parts of the U.S. as well. Texas is but one of twelve states in the U.S.
that has yet to remove their sodomy or homosexual conduct statutes from their penal codes, and

1 Andrew Kreighbaum and Darren Meritz, “Two Gay Men Kicked Out of Chico’s Tacos Restaurant for
Kissing,” El Paso Times, July 9, 2009, accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_12790543;
Daniel Borunda, “’Chico’s Five’ Settle Suit for Improved Police Training,” El Paso Times, May 16, 2012, accessed
October 25, 2014, http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_20632443.
2 Marty Schladen, “Rollback on city benefits policy wins easy approval,” El Paso Times, November 3,
2010, accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_16504987.
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it’s not the only one in which those statutes are still being enforced. Between 2011 and 2013, at
least a dozen men were arrested for violations of Louisiana’s “unnatural carnal copulation”
statute in East Baton Rouge Parish. The arrests were the result of a sting operation that targeted
gay men by using undercover operatives to solicit free and consensual acts of sodomy. While the
operation garnered national attention, leading the parish sheriff to make a public apology and
promise to “ensure better supervision, training, and guidance” in 2013, the gay and lesbian
community is still a target for those who hold a narrow and contorted perception of civil rights. 3
Following the recent Supreme Court decisions which effectively legalized same-sex marriage in
the U.S., there is currently a coalitional drive among conservative policymakers in which they
are vying for a broadly conceived Constitutional protection for individuals or businesses who
base discrimination against same-sex couples upon religious convictions.4 But the basis for such
discrimination is far more problematic than this simplistic policy goal suggests.
Discrimination against gays and lesbians in the U.S. is based on a conceptually negligent
association of homosexuality with sodomy. When the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s
sodomy statute and sanctioned its enforcement against private, consensual acts of sodomy
between same-sex couples in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), they did so partly on the basis that
“Proscriptions against [homosexual sodomy] have ancient roots.” Making such an association is
problematic because it is often done without giving due attention to the rich and complicated
history of how sodomy has been conceived as a term, act, and crime. Sodomy is a religiously
rooted term engendered by a medieval interpretation of the biblical story about the sin and
3 Campbell Robertson, “After Arrests on Charges of Sodomy, an Apology,” New York Times, July 29,
2013, accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/after-arrests-on-charges-of-sodomy-anapology.html.
4 “Republican Platform, 2016,” 9, 11-12, accessed July 20, 2016, https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.
amazonaws.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf. The current Republican Party
Platform directly addresses the decisions in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) and Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) as having “robbed 320 million Americans of their legitimate constitutional authority
to define marriage as the union of one man and one woman.”

3

destruction of the city of Sodom. While the admonishment of sodomy (and by extension, that of
homosexuality) is based firmly in religious convictions, the term of sodomy has lost its religious
connotation through the secularization of sodomy proscriptions. The ways in which an act of
sodomy has been conceived in both religious and secular frameworks are numerous. From
idolatry to anal sex and from witchcraft to masturbation, the catchall term of sodomy has been
used to label a number of acts, both sexual and not. The religious and secular histories of sodomy
as a term and the multiple acts covered under its wide umbrella have led to the creation of
ambiguous criminal statutes that have been enforced in various ways. By positing the history of
the Texas sodomy statutes as endemic to this genealogy, this thesis shows that it is highly
problematic and ahistorical to link a modern group of individuals who engage in a specific type
of sexual behavior to the broadly constituted concept of sodomy and its repudiation.
THE TEXAS SODOMY STATUTES
The enactment of the 1973 Texas homosexual conduct statute is endemic of the nescience
in associating homosexuality with sodomy. The Texas penal code currently defines homosexual
conduct as a sexual offense consisting of “any contact between any part of the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another person [of the same sex].”5 This definition is rooted in a
portion of the state’s 1943 sodomy statute, which read:
Whoever has carnal copulation with a beast, or in an opening of the body, except sexual
parts, with another human being, or whoever shall use his mouth on the sexual parts of
another human being for the purpose of having carnal copulation, or who shall
voluntarily permit the use of his own sexual parts in a lewd and lascivious manner by any
minor, shall be guilty of sodomy.6

5

Penal Code, TX (1973), §21.01a, 21.06, accessed July 22, 2016, http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/?

link=PE.
6

Journal of the House of Representatives, Forty-Eighth Legislature, State of Texas (Austin: A. C. Baldwin
& Sons, 1943), 931, accessed September 26, 2014, http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/Housejournals/48/H_48_0.pdf.
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The connection between the 1973 homosexual conduct and 1943 sodomy statutes is that they
both deem anal and oral sex criminal acts, but they do so in different ways. Whereas the older
statute gave no distinction in proscribing against hetero- or homosexual acts of sodomy, the
current one targets the sexual behavior of gay men and lesbians specifically. Furthermore, the
1943 statute included acts of bestiality and child molestation in its definition of sodomy, but
these acts have nothing to do with homosexuality. The distinction between the two statutes is
greater than their similarity.
The “ancient roots” that proscriptions against homosexuality are purported to have in
sodomy laws become even more problematic in linking the 1973 Texas homosexual conduct
statute to the state’s first sodomy statute. The Eighth Texas Legislature added a sodomy statute
to the state’s three-year-old penal code in 1860. The statute gave no specific definition to the act
or criminal nature of sodomy, simply stating that, “If any person shall commit, with mankind or
beast, the abominable and detestable crime against nature, he shall be deemed guilty of
sodomy.”7 The ambiguous language used in the statute corresponded with other states’ sodomy
laws at the time, and it reflected the centuries-old rhetorical characterization of the crime as
“peccatum illude horribile, inter Christianos non nominandum (that abominable sin not fit to be
named among Christians).”8 On the other hand, the 1860 Texas sodomy statute’s enforcement
did illicit the unmentionable crime’s utterance in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century
court records and newspapers, transforming an ambiguous definition of sodomy into multifarious
meanings. What these records don’t mention, however, is homosexuality.

7 The Penal Code of the State of Texas (Galveston: The News Office, 1857), 3, accessed September 26,
2014, http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/Scanned/statutes_and_codes/Penal_Code.pdf. It is important to make the distinction
between an “act” and the “criminal nature” of sodomy because each hold different implications for how
proscriptions against sodomy have been interpreted and enforced.
8 Wainwright Churchill, Homosexual Behavior Among Males: A Cross-Cultural and Cross-Species
Investigation (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), 206
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The purpose of this thesis is to impugn the continued legal and political discrimination
against gay men and lesbians through policy and law in the United States. This is done by
exploring the history of sodomy as it has been conceptualized through the creation and
enforcement of the Texas sodomy statutes between 1860 and 1973. I argue that the evolution of
the concept of sodomy from its inception as a broad criminal category in the 1860 Texas sodomy
statute to its more-narrow conceptualization by Texas legislators as a behavioral characteristic of
homosexual status in the 1973 homosexual conduct statute was a political and historically
contingent process.9 That is to say that the modern association of homosexuality with sodomy—
as it is invoked to justify anti-gay legislation—has become cemented over time through
deliberate and strategic efforts by lawmakers, police, and judges who have worked to create and
uphold political boundaries of exclusion for gay men and lesbians in the state of Texas.
The process of transforming a multifarious term (sodomy) into an explicitly defined
behavioral characteristic of a legally-defined identity (homosexuality) was political in two
important ways. First, this evolution allowed for the construction of political identities based on
bodily practices: Regardless of how an act of sodomy was defined, individuals who allegedly
perpetrated such a “crime” were often relegated to a status that was antithetical to state or
national citizenship. Secondly, and in relation to this sodomitical body politics, shifting
conceptualizations of sodomy were strategically utilized by local law enforcement, judges, and
state lawmakers in Texas in order to exert power and maintain control over different groups of
people for a number of historically contingent reasons between 1860 and 1973. This is seen in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century racialization of the crime, which produced greater
bond amounts, prison sentences, and vitriolic condemnation for acts of sodomy alleged against
9

I use the term “political” here as it relates to politics being “the use of intrigue or strategy in obtaining any
position of power or control,” as defined by Dictionary.com, Random House, Inc., accessed July 22, 2016,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/politics.
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nonwhite men than were done so against white men in Texas. And as immigration and antiimmigrant sentiments grew exponentially during this period, sodomy was also seen as a
characteristic of foreignness, compounding white anxieties about race or ethnicity with fears of
foreign invasion and later, communist infiltration. By the mid-to-late twentieth century, sodomy
had become perceived as an infectious tool used by rapists, child molesters, and “homosexuals”
(who, in the public eye, could have all been one and the same) to prey upon American
communities and lead innocent children into a life of depravity. All of these groups—the
nonwhite, foreigners, political subversives, and gays and lesbians—were each targeted for
exclusion in Texas using the sodomy statutes at some point between 1860 and 1973, and the
ambiguity that had surrounded sodomy for centuries played a key role in this process.
The politicization of sexual behavior and human bodies in Texas by way of the state’s
sodomy statutes was made possible through not just the ambiguity of sodomy, but also through a
dualistic conceptualization of sodomy adopted in the legislature, at crime scenes, and in court
rooms across the state. On one hand, sodomy was conceived as an act. Such a conception often
served as a limitation to the enforcement of the Texas sodomy statutes. For example, an appeals
court judge overturned a sodomy conviction against Charlie Prindle in 1893 because the statute
at the time did not explicitly proscribe the act which the appellant had committed in a child’s
mouth.10 On the other hand, sodomy was also conceived as a behavior—often attributed to a
specific type of person who was prone to habitually committing acts of sodomy—or more
specifically, as an identity. The distinction between an act of sodomy and sodomitical status is
important because, unlike the former, the latter is connected to a process of Othering. Six men
were arrested in El Paso in March 1956, for example, not because they were caught in acts of

10

Prindle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App. 551 (1893).
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sodomy, but because they were allegedly “homosexuals.”11 According to the common
understanding of homosexuality during the mid-twentieth century, which was reflective of both
legal and medical discourses surrounding the subject, “homosexuals” were predisposed to the
criminal behavior of sodomy (as much as nonwhites and foreigners were in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries). Arrests for sodomy were therefore also status charges in addition
to charges for criminal acts. I must be clear, however, that while the purpose of this thesis relates
to anti-gay discrimination, my primary focus here is on the history of sodomy, not
homosexuality.
SODOMY AS AN HISTORICAL SUBJECT
The history of homosexuality in the U.S. is not complete without reference to sodomy
and its proscription over the past several centuries. Nor is the history of sodomy complete
without acknowledging its current conceptualization as “homosexual conduct.” I explore the
latter history in this thesis rather than the former for two reasons. First, sodomy is seldom
explored as an historical subject. It appears more frequently as an historical object used in studies
that pertain to broader subjects—most commonly, the history of homosexuality (but also more
general histories of sexuality, gender, religion, and law). Still, this body of works adds a valuable
perspective to the present study and helps to situate it in a larger discourse of scholarship. This
leads to my second reason for exploring the history of sodomy in this thesis rather than that of
homosexuality: By looking beyond the boundaries that are normally placed on the study of
sodomy and its criminalization, this thesis also engages in dialogues that center on the
constitution of gender, race, and sexuality, as well as more generally, Otherness, within criminal
law in Texas and the U.S.

11

El Paso Herald Post, March 22, 1956, 5, 28.
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The historiography that has been produced by the study of the history of homosexuality
has typically taken one of two approaches, according to classicist and gay historian David M.
Halperin in his 2002 book How to Do the History of Homosexuality: essentialist or
constructionist.12 The essentialist approach posits that homosexuality has existed—not by name,
but by practice—in every society throughout history. While this position is not necessarily an
anachronistic imposition of sexual identity upon peoples who existed in history before the
construction of sexual identities (although some scholars in the 1970s and 1980s have done
exactly that), this approach is still outdated and allows for the tendency to blur the lines between
important social and historical nuances in the development of homosexuality. Studies that take a
constructionist approach, on the other hand, follow French theorist Michel Foucault’s contention
that the “homosexual” came into being as “a personage, a past, a case history, and a child, in
addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology” during the late nineteenth
century.13 But even the assertion that homosexuality is a modern invention is incomplete.
There is a teleological tendency inherent in the constructionist approach that places the
history of homosexuality within an acts/status dichotomy. This teleology indicates that, before
the social identification of gay men and lesbians, men and women who engaged in homosexual
acts were perceived for a period of time as exactly that: men and women who were, for whatever
reason (by influence of the devil, pathology, or racial taint, depending on the time period and the
institution concerned with the matter), engaged in acts. Foucault explains that, for centuries,
“sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridicial

12

David Halperin, How to Do the History of Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002),

7-23.
13

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Vintage Books, 1990), 43.

9

subject of them.”14 The late nineteenth-century invention of the “homosexual” by sexologists
such as Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud, German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, and
English physician Henry Havelock Ellis marks the constructionist shift from understanding
homosexuality as an act to conceiving it as an identity. But in light of the complicated history of
sodomy, there is a need to disrupt this teleology.
Homosexuality is better understood as an ongoing process of reinvention. That is to say,
it did not simply appear as an absolute concept of same-sex eroticism in the late nineteenth
century, manifested in intimate acts of sodomy (same-sex anal or oral intercourse), and reified in
the modern “homosexual”; rather, homosexuality is a fluid categorical enterprise that continues
to both shape and be shaped by institutions which it encounters. Take, for example, the encounter
of homosexuality with the practice of psychiatry, which Foucault touches on in his 1972 work
History of Madness and explores more elaborately four years later in the first volume of The
History of Sexuality. It was in this encounter that Foucault argues that homosexuality first
became a human category (not to mention a term) which was used to classify what gay historian
Jonathan Ned Katz calls “psychological anomalies, freaks.”15 This classification was a matter of
contention over the several decades that followed this initial encounter, however, and the
psychiatric concept of homosexuality was reinvented numerous times—as an inversion of
biological sex by many early sexologists, a treatable pathology by Richard von Krafft-Ebing in
the late nineteenth century, a non-treatable pathology by Sigmund Freud in the early twentieth
century, and as a natural sexual behavior by U.S. biologist Alfred Kinsey in the mid-twentieth
century—before the American Psychiatric Association decided in 1973 to declassify

14

Ibid.
Jonathan Ned Katz, The Invention of Heterosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007),
Kindle ed., Loc. 113.
15
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homosexuality as a pathological condition.16 The same perfidious conceptualization of
homosexuality can be seen in the category’s encounters with different institutions in the U.S. as
well. In her 2009 book The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century
America, historian Margot Canaday explores how a hetero-homosexual binary was inscribed in
federal immigration, welfare, and military policies in the U.S. She argues that the early- to midtwentieth-century bureaucratic State “did not merely implicate but also constituted
homosexuality in the construction of a stratified citizenry.”17 As with its encounter with
psychiatry, homosexuality was both reinvented by and helped to shape “federal citizenship
policy” in the U.S.
The connection between sodomy and homosexuality is much more disjointed than the
history of homosexuality suggests, and using sodomy as an historical subject helps to highlight
the fissures between the histories of sodomy and homosexuality. The first and most conspicuous
difference is each history’s temporality. Whereas homosexuality is recognized as being a modern
invention, the history of sodomy spans centuries. Sodomy was attributed to all manners of sexual
deviancy by early Christian theologians such as Augustine of Hippo in the fourth and fifth
centuries, Peter Damian in the eleventh century, and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century.
Throughout the Middle Ages, religious and secular proscriptions against sodomy also targeted
nonsexual acts ranging from witchcraft to treason, hence another fissure: Unlike homosexuality,
sodomy is not ubiquitously defined along the lines of sexual acts or behavior. From the early
modern period until sodomy was first criminalized in Texas in 1860, sodomy statutes employed
16 Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis: A Medico-Forensic Study (New York: Pioneer
Publications, Inc., 1947); Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, trans. and ed. James Strachey
(New York: Avon Books, 1962); Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, Sexual Behavior in
the Human Male (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1948); Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde E.
Martin, and Paul H. Gebhard, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company,
1953).
17 Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4.
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ambiguous language to target various “criminals” who committed various “crimes.” The history
of sodomy has produced what I call a “legacy of confusion.” This legacy is defined by three
main factors: First, the proscriptions against sodomy found in both religious and secular texts
often use highly ambiguous language. Second, these ambiguous proscriptions have both
perpetuated and led to multifarious interpretations of sodomy. Lastly, sodomy’s legacy of
confusion is defined by the way that ambiguous language and sundry interpretations have been
used as a tool to construct and exclude what I call the “sodomitical Other.”
THE SODOMITICAL OTHER
The history of sodomy and its criminalization in the state of Texas allows for a profound
insight into much more than just the construction of the modern “homosexual” in the U.S. This
history also provides an insight into the broader process of how the law is used to construct and
define Otherness in general. I define Otherness in this thesis more generally as a legal category
that is constructed to be the antithesis to citizenship in the U.S. nation-state. Canaday suggests
that citizenship is conceived as either practice (“the activity of being a citizen”) or as a legal or
cultural status (“citizenship as identity”).18 I consider both of these conceptions conjointly in my
definition of Otherness. For example, citizenship has been defined in the history of the U.S.
along lines of gender, race, and sexuality. That is to say that an individual’s racial, gendered, or
sexual identity marked them with either a citizen or Other status at the same time that it either
enabled or prohibited them from civic or political participation in the nation. In this sense, the
Naturalization Act of 1790 Othered all women and nonwhite men by inscribing maleness and
whiteness as prerequisites to U.S. citizenship. And as heterosexuality came to be inscribed in
federal citizenship policy during the twentieth century, gay men and lesbians also became targets

18

Ibid., 8.
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of exclusion. The creation and enforcement of the Texas sodomy statutes helped to produce a
multifarious sodomitical Other that was denied both the practice and status of citizenship through
investigation, persecution, and incarceration by the state as well as through ostracization by the
public. There were three other important conceptual factors that contributed to this construction
which I consider in this thesis: gender, race, and sexuality.
Gender is defined by the social ramifications of how differences in biological sex are
perceived, discussed, and in many ways imposed. As such, and according to women’s historian
Joan Wallach Scott, “gender becomes a way of denoting ‘cultural constructions’—the entirely
social creation of ideas about appropriate roles for women and men.”19 Various determinations
made about biological sex have often been compounded with cultural expectations regarding
human behavior, resulting in the construction of specific gender roles. In a sense, masculinity is
masculine through its contradistinction with femininity, and vice versa. In addition, the
deployment of gender expectations through their association with other social constructions has
been relied upon as a tool of various institutions of power to ensure the establishment of rule and
order. For example, U.S. gender historian Gail Bederman argues in her book, Manliness and
Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917, that
middle-class white men infused ideas about race and masculinity in order to reestablish
dominance over what they deemed a racially inferior and feminine underclass amidst radical
changes in U.S. demographics and economics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Bederman’s study points out that gender is fluid and “a historical, ideological process.” She
explains that, “The ideological process of gender—whether manhood or womanhood—works
through a complex political technology, composed of a variety of institutions, ideas, and daily
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practices.”20 As a malleable process of conceptualization, gender becomes fixable to other social
constructions, serving as a dual reinforcement for both itself and other constructive processes
that help to classify the Other.
Race, like gender, is unequivocally a socially constructed collection of ideas about
biological difference and proper human behavior which, while not real in and of themselves,
have very real ramifications in society. The ways race has been conceived carry with them
several similarities with gender: conceptions of race are based in perceived difference; race is
fluid and subjective to shifting perceptions, discussions, and impositions; and race, as a mark of
difference, can be a powerful tool of exclusion, especially when associated with other social
constructions like gender or sexuality. Nineteenth-century historian Matthew Frye Jacobson
notes in his study, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home
and Abroad, 1876-1917, that conceptions of race fueled epistemic anxieties regarding the future
of the white race in the early twentieth century. Alarmed at the racial heterogeneity that was
caused by the mass migration of “degraded races” to the U.S. at the time, many feared for
“America’s traditional Anglo-Saxon political grandeur and its disruption by these swarthy
streams of obvious inferiors.”21 In his book, West of Sex: Making Mexican America, 1900-1930,
western historian Pablo Mitchell places these Anglo-Saxon anxieties within the context of the
U.S. West. He claims that, along with racial taxonomies, “Assessing families and domesticity,
determining proper sexual behavior, gender roles, reproduction, and parenting was at the heart of
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1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5, 7.
21 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home
and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 197.
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colonial rule.”22 The concept of race, like gender, was used in the construction of a form of rule
over human bodies.
Ideas about sexuality, again similar to those of gender and race, were constructed within
shifting cultural contexts and were easily fixable to other social constructions. Mitchell asserts
that “American race relations and racial hierarchies … are incomprehensible without a serious
examination of sexuality.”23 Americanist Jennifer Terry claims in her 1999 book, An American
Obsession: Science, Medicine, and Homosexuality in Modern Times, that studies on
homosexuality reveal American culture’s “detectable subtexts that signal worries about the
precariousness of masculinity, the specter of feminism, the rise of urban sexual subcultures, the
instability of marriage and the family, and the dangers of class-crossing and race-mixing.”24
Terry’s claim suggests that any study into various subjects of history is incomplete without an
analysis of sexuality. Foucault would agree:
[Sexuality] appears … as an especially dense transfer point for relations of power:
between men and women, young people and old people, parents and offspring, teachers
and students, priests and laity, an administration and a population. Sexuality is not the
most intractable element in power relations, but rather one of those endowed with the
greatest instrumentality: useful for the greatest number of maneuvers and capable of
serving as a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied strategies.25
Sexuality is central to the workings of a society, especially when that society functions within the
context of power differentials in the establishment of rule and order.
Legal mechanisms of power have a deep investment in the social constructions of gender,
race, and sexuality. The imposition of “proper” gender roles, hierarchies of racial designations,
and ideas about acceptable human sexual behavior are all rooted in “biopower,” which Foucault
22
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Press, 2007), 37
23 Ibid., 2.
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defines as “the subjugation of bodies and control of populations” through any number of
techniques which are often but not exclusively deployed by the State.26 One of the most
important aspects of biopower as it relates to this study is its capacity for production. Foucault
argues that biopower “produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The
individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.”27 In other
words, biopower contains the ability to produce human subjects that serve the purpose of
perpetuating both the power over bodies and the institutions that exert it. Criminal law serves as
a prime example of this productive capacity in that it inscribes the limits of acceptable human
behavior from which two distinct human categories are produced: the lawful (those within the
statutory limits) and the criminal (those outside them).
Discourse is the most important technique which criminal law uses in its deployment of
biopower. Foucault argues that “power and knowledge are joined together” in discourse, and as
such, he conceives of “discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is
neither uniform nor stable.” He explains further:
[W]e must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and
excluded discourse, or between dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a
multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this
distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, the
enunciations required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and
different effects—according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional
context in which he happens to be situated—that it implies; and with the shifts and
reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes.28
The multifarious discourse that emerges from the records of sodomy cases in Texas during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries gives an insight into the inchoate operation of the law in
controlling bodies in Texas. As such, these cases are an integral part of the larger history of
26

Ibid., 140.
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage
Books, 1995), 194.
28 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100.
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sodomy in the state at the same time that they highlight the fluidity of the ideological expressions
of perceived differences and cultural notions of human behavior that make up the social
constructions of gender, race, and sexuality. This sodomitical discourse directly shaped the
making of a multifaceted imaginary model of anticitizenship—the sodomitical Other—and it still
holds power today in antigay legislation.

The following two chapters excavate the legal discourse surrounding sodomy that is
found in Texas court records, legislative documents, and newspapers between 1860 and 1973.
This selective timeline of the state’s proscriptions against sodomy holds important implications
regarding the conceptual progression from an acts-based understanding of sodomy to one which
is based on status or identity. The creation of the Texas sodomy statutes and their varying
enforcement show that such a trajectory was not linear. It was rather a consistent and historically
contingent fluctuation between these ideas in which sodomy was construed both as an act that
represented a fluke in an individual’s moral judgement and as a marker of an individual’s
Otherness and predisposition for degeneracy. Chapter two explores the legal incongruity in
conceiving exactly what constituted the act and criminal nature of sodomy between 1860 and
1943. It roots both the problems and efficacy of the 1860 sodomy statute’s ambiguous language
in the centuries-long legacy of confusion that preceded it. Chapter two also sets the foundation
for how the sodomitical Other was constructed in Texas, which is the subject of chapter three.
The third chapter looks closely at the intersections of gender, race, and sexuality within Texas
law and how from 1860 to 1973 that intersection became the discursive launching point for the
sodomitical Other.
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2. “That utterly confused category”: Defining Sodomy in Texas, 1860-1943
For many years, we have all been living … under the spell of an immense curiosity about sex, bent
on questioning it, with an insatiable desire to hear it speak and be spoken about, quick to invent all
sorts of magical rings that might force it to abandon its discretion. As if it were essential for us to
be able to draw from that little piece of ourselves not only pleasure but knowledge, and a whole
subtle interchange from one to the other: a knowledge of pleasure, a pleasure that comes of
knowing pleasure, a knowledge-pleasure; and as if that fantastic animal we accommodate had
itself such finely tuned ears, such searching eyes, so gifted a tongue and mind, as to know much
and be quite willing to tell it, provided we employed a little skill in urging it to speak.
—Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction

There was no debate in the eighth Texas Legislature over the addition of a sodomy statute
to the state penal code in 1860. The House and Senate Journals from the 1859-1860 legislative
session show that state lawmakers were more concerned with other matters affecting the welfare
of the state. Texas governor Hardin Richard Runnels addressed both chambers in a letter on
November 9, 1859, laying out what would be the paramount affairs for the entire legislative
session. There were four major concerns. First, the particulars of land appropriations for the
University of Texas. Second, dealing with the tripartite violence between white frontier settlers,
ethnic Mexicans, and Apaches along the Rio Grande river. Third, the encroachment of railroads
and corporations upon the interests of the state government. And finally, the looming clash of
northern and southern ideologies that would soon lead to secession and the Civil War.1 Other
concerns were introduced and addressed in the legislative discourse between November 1859
and February 1860, but the state’s first sodomy statute was added to the Texas Penal Code
without even a mention of the word sodomy in the House or Senate.2

1 Journal of the House of Representatives, Eighth Legislature, State of Texas (Austin: John Marshall &
Co., 1860), 25-51, accessed September 26, 2014, http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/HouseJournals/8/
houseJournal8thLegEntire.pdf. These concerns were first addressed in the first letter to the house for the session
from the governor.
2 The sodomy statute was most likely discussed within a legislative committee designated to deal with
amending the state’s first penal code, but those records are not available.

18

Most of the eighth legislature’s proposed amendments to the penal code were written in
attempts to make the language used in criminal statutes more clear. Article 9 of the state’s first
penal code required that criminal statutes reflect “the plain import of the words of a law,” and
Article 6 rendered “wholly inoperable” any penal statute deemed unclear or in contradiction with
another statute. This issue was so important to Texas lawmakers that even Article 9 was
amended during the previous legislative session to include clearer language about criminal
statutes requiring clearer language.3 But the language used in the first Texas sodomy statute was
in no way transparent. Like most of the state sodomy statutes created in the U.S. before 1860, the
criminal proscription in Texas combined the ambiguous language used in English statutes
accredited to King Henry VIII and Sir William Blackstone. The Texas statute simply stated that
“any person [who] shall commit the abominable and detestable crime against nature…shall be
deemed guilty of sodomy.”4
The Texas Legislature’s emphasis of using clear language in the penal code juxtaposed
with the ambiguity of the language employed in the state’s sodomy statute is compelling, and
given the lack of focus on the statute’s creation in legislative documents, this paradox seems
unexplainable. Legal scholar Dale Carpenter suggests that even though state sodomy statutes
were ambiguous, “there was little confusion about the assumed meaning.”5 But this suggestion
can be questioned when considering the more than 100 appeals cases heard in the U.S. during the
nineteenth century that made mention of sodomy (or “buggery” or “the crime against nature”).
As gay historian Jonathan Ned Katz points out through his study of these cases in his book Love
Stories: Sex Between Men Before Homosexuality, more than half of these appeals cases took
3 Penal Code, TX (1857), 3; Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, Vol. IV, 1028.
4 Walter Barnett, Sexual Freedom and the Constitution: An Inquiry into the Constitutionality of Repressive
Sex Laws (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), 81; Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story
of Lawrence v. Texas (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012), 3-5; Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, Vol. IV, 1459.
5 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 5.
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place in the western U.S., and a total of twenty-four cases were from Texas alone—more than
any other state.6 The exact meaning of an act of sodomy came into question in the majority of
these cases. Historian Jacqueline N. Moore determined that, of these twenty-four cases, only
eight were appeals to actual sodomy convictions, but they were on the grounds of contesting the
legal interpretations of the ambiguous crime. Did an act of oral sex constitute an act of sodomy?
What about acts of child molestation? Could an act of sodomy be committed against (or even by)
a woman? And if an act of bestiality was commonly understood as an act of sodomy, then what
evidence of the act was needed to secure a conviction? The larger question left to be answered
today is, if sodomy was reported to have a widely understood and common meaning, why were
there so many appeals to how the term was interpreted in criminal courts?7
Sodomy has always been what Michel Foucault calls “that utterly confused category,”
but knowledge of the term’s rich and confused history is lost on much of the general public
today.8 Sodomy is often regarded now as simply being an act of anal sex and it is commonly
thought of as being exclusively associated with homosexuality. This association is flawed,
however, because there have been a variety of other “acts” which have fit under the umbrella
term of “sodomy” over the past several centuries that have nothing to do with erotic same-sex
desire. Varied interpretations of what constituted sodomy were developed by a diverse group of
authorities on the subject—from medieval Christian theologians such as Peter Damian and
Thomas Aquinas to eighteenth-century English legal scholar Sir William Blackstone, for
example—resulting in a paradoxical discourse of both silence (as the crime not fit to be named)

6 Katz, Love Stories: Sex Between Men Before Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2001), 61.
7 Jacqueline N. Moore, Cowboys and Cattlemen: Class and Masculinities on the Texas Frontier, 18651900 (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 241n. The other sixteen cases were either about slander
(surprisingly several of them) or were lacking any detail in the court records.
8 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 101.
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and articulation (through criminal charges and prosecutions) that was manifest in the U.S. from
colonial times on into the twentieth century.
The confusion that Foucault attributes to sodomy lies in the question, what (exactly) is it?
Legislators, judges, and law enforcement in Texas were forced to address this question in a
number of legal encounters with different “criminal” acts between 1860 and 1943. This chapter
explores the varied responses to these encounters as well as the no less varied answers to the
question, what is sodomy? State newspapers, court records, and legislative documents provide a
keen insight into how both the act and criminal nature of sodomy were conceptualized within a
legal context by lawmen, judges, and lawmakers. In excavating this sodomitical discourse from
the available sources, this chapter shows how there was hardly a consensus on the legal meaning
of an act or the criminal nature of sodomy in Texas during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
The first section of this chapter explores the roots of confusion in the varied and shifting
understandings of sodomy throughout several centuries preceding the creation of the first Texas
sodomy statute in 1860. The second section looks closely at how an act of sodomy was
interpreted in nineteenth-century legislative documents, court records, and newspaper accounts
in Texas. This section also highlights how sodomy’s legacy of confusion impeded the sodomy
statute’s enforcement in Texas. The third section delves into the criminal nature of sodomy in
Texas, which, like the act itself, was and continues to be impossible to isolate into one definition.
The last section examines how the long legacy of confusion shaped the state’s response to a
dramatic increase in sodomy arrests leading to the creation of a new sodomy statute in 1943.
Overall, the 1860 Texas sodomy statute and its enforcement served as a continuation of the
legacy of confusion that preceded it, and as such, it stands as an important and often overlooked
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part of a long and complicated history of the human body and the mechanisms put in place to
control it.
A LEGACY OF CONFUSION
Sodomy is etymologically linked to the ancient city of Sodom, which, according to the
Bible, was destroyed by the Hebrew god because of its immorality. The definition of the term is
not as easy to trace through history, however. The “sin of Sodom” and thus the reason for the
city’s destruction is vaguely described in Genesis 18:20 as simply being “very grievous.” One
interpretation of what constituted the sin of Sodom is that it was the Sodomites’ engagement in
erotic same-sex acts, or more anachronistically, homosexuality. This interpretation derives from
Genesis 19:5. In this biblical passage, male residents of Sodom demand that Abraham’s nephew,
Lot, turn over two angels that were visiting him in the city, saying, “Bring them out unto us, that
we may know them.”9 Another translation of this passage even substitutes the word “rape” for
the word “know.” But Christian theologian Derrick Sherwin Bailey has argued that this
translation and others similar to it are incorrect. He contends that the English word “know” in the
King James Version of this passage was translated from the Hebrew yadha’, which in this
context means “get acquainted with.” He also notes that “it is exceptional to find yadha’
employed in a coital sense,” and on the rare occasion that it is, it is strictly used to denote coitus
between a man and a woman.10 Theologians of the medieval Christian Church adopted the first
interpretation, associating the biblical proscription against same-sex coitus—“Thou shall not lie

9 Gen. 18:20, 19:5, King James Version. The word “rape” in Gen. 19:5 is used in the Revised Berkeley
Version.
10 Derrick Sherwin Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition (Hamden: Archon Books,
1975), 3-6.
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with mankind, as with womankind”—with the sin of Sodom, or “sodomy.”

11

But this

association is far from exclusive.
There is yet a different interpretation for what specific transgression underlies the sin of
sodomy. According to medieval historian Michael Goodich, the biblical prohibition of same-sex
coitus was originally meant to assure that there was a clear religious distinction between the
Hebrews and their pagan neighbors. Groups of people such as the Chaldeans and Canaanites
were reported to have practiced many sexual acts, including those between members of the same
sex, in their religious rituals.12 As such, engaging in erotic same-sex acts was considered a form
of idolatry by the ancient Hebrews. According to religious historian Wainwright Churchill, the
ancient Hebrews considered “almost any practice [sexual or not] that was associated with the
religious life of non-Jews … as a form of idolatry,” and this perspective was adopted by the
Christian Church during its early development.13 In the first stages of Rome’s new state religion,
engaging in erotic same-sex acts was seen as a practice carried out by pagans and heathens and it
was thus associated with idolatry, witchcraft, and heresy. As early modern historian William E.
Monter argues, the “intense hatred of sexual deviance in Western Christendom was closely
associated with religious deviance.”14 In this view, the process of Othering is at the root of
proscriptions against sodomy. The ancient Hebrews and early Christians used erotic same-sex
behavior as an identifier of ethnic or religious Otherness, and as such, laid the foundations for the
construction of a sodomitical Other in the West.

11 Lev. 18:22, New King James Version.
12 Michael Goodich, The Unmentionable Vice: Homosexuality in the Later Medieval Period (Santa
Barbara: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1979), x. Also see Churchill, 200.
13 Churchill, 200.
14 William E. Monter, “Sodomy and Heresy in Early Modern Switzerland,” in Historical Perspectives on
Homosexuality, ed. Salvatore J. Licata and Robert P. Peterson (New York: Haworth Press, Inc., 1981), 41.
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Medieval Christian theologians such as Augustine of Hippo and Peter Damian expanded
the transgressive category that included the sin of sodomy through a new discourse that centered
on “nature.” Augustine equated sodomy to “the sins belonging to lust” in the fourth century and
claimed that, out of all such sins, “that which is against nature is the worst.”15 Peter Damian
agreed with Augustine in 1049, writing that sodomy was an “act of insane, unbridled lust” and
that, “Unquestionably, this vice … surpasses the enormity of all others.” Damian emphasized the
grievousness of the sin, claiming: “It is the vice that violates temperance, slays modesty,
strangles chastity, and slaughters virginity with a knife dipped in the filthiest poison.”16 By
positing the “befouling cancer of sodomy” within a larger categories of lust and the unnatural,
Augustine and Damian conflated several sexual acts to mark sodomy as a blanket term. Damian
defined sodomy as masturbation, mutual masturbation, femoral coitus, and anal sex.17 Another
early Church father, Thomas Aquinas, disagreed with Damian over two hundred years later by
trying to relegate sodomy to just “copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with
female.” At the same time, however, Aquinas included “every genital contact intended to
produce orgasm other than penile-vaginal intercourse in an approved position” within the larger
category of “unnatural acts.”18 As these religious proscriptions gradually became secularized as
criminal statutes in Europe beginning in the twelfth century, “sodomy” and “unnatural acts”
became interchangeable, allowing Augustine’s and Damian’s interpretation of sodomy as a

15 As quoted in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, question 154, 12, accessed 15 February 2016,
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/aquinas-homo.asp.
16 Peter Damian, Letter 31, trans. Owen J. Blum, in The Fathers of the Church Medieval Continuation:
The Letters of Peter Damian, 31-60 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 30-31, accessed 15
February 2016, https://books.google.com/books.
17 Ibid., 6-7.
18 Aquinas, 11; “Brief of Professors of History George Chauncey, Nancy F. Cott, John D’Emilio, Estelle
B. Freedman, Thomas C. Holt, John Howard, Lynn Hunt, Mark D. Jordan, Elizabeth Lapovsky Kennedy, and Linda
P. Kerber as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,” Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 4-5, accessed 29
February 2016, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-102/02-102.mer.ami.hist.pdf.
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catchall term to take precedence. The result was that charges of sodomy came to describe even
more various transgressions against Christian morals and the Crown.
The ambiguity of the language used in European criminal sodomy proscriptions led to
arrests and charges for various sexual transgressions into the early modern period, including anal
and oral sex, bestiality, child molestation, masturbation, incest, and even interreligious or
interracial sex. But charges of sodomy were not limited to sexual acts. Offenders were often
conjointly charged with idolatry, heresy, witchcraft, abortion, arson, robbery, or even treason.
Punishments for the crime of sodomy also varied throughout medieval Europe, including burning
at the stake, decapitation, castration, and hanging, but they almost always resulted in death.19
Early modern historian Maria R. Boes notes that, while the expanded definition and
interpretation of sodomy led to an overall “explosion of prosecutions” in Europe between the
mid-thirteenth and late seventeenth centuries, the enforcement of sodomy proscriptions “did not
manifest itself uniformly.”20 Several other historians concur with Boes, pointing out that
understandings of what constituted an act of sodomy and the cultural attitudes toward it varied
from community to community, kingdom to kingdom, and culture to culture.21
One fascinating example of the heterogeneity of how sodomy was interpreted as a crime
can be found in the case of John/Eleanor Rykener. In December 1394, a woman named Eleanor

19 For associations with other crimes, see Maria R. Boes, “On Trial for Sodomy in Early Modern
Germany,” in Sodomy in Early Modern Europe, ed. Tom Betteridge (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2002), 29; Monter, 41-48; and Churchill, 202, 206. For Punishments, see Goodich, The Unmentionable Vice, 77-80.
20 Boes, 27.
21 See, for example: John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1980); Vern L. Bullough, Sexual Variance in Society and History (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1976); N.S. Davidson, “Sodomy in Early Modern Venice,” in Sodomy in Early Modern Europe, ed. Tom Betteridge
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002): 65-81; Arthur N. Gilbert, “Conceptions of Homosexuality,” in
Historical Perspectives on Homosexuality, ed. Salvatore J. Licata and Robert P. Peterson (New York: Haworth
Press, Inc., 1981); Goodich, The Unmentionable Vice; Monter, “Sodomy and Heresy”; Ruth Mazo Karras and
David Lorenzo Boyd, “’Ut cum muliere’: A Male Transvestite Prostitute in Fourteenth-Century London,” in
Premodern Sexualities, ed. Louise Fradenburg and Carla Freccero (New York: Routledge, 1996), Kindle ed.; Kim
M. Phillips and Barry Reay, Sex Before Sexuality: A Premodern History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
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Rykener was detained for prostitution in London. What befuddled Eleanor’s interrogators
following her arrest was that she was not, as she claimed and appeared to be, a woman.
According to the official document transcribing the interrogation of John/Eleanor Rykener,
which was first published by medieval historians Ruth Mazo Karras and David Lorenzo Boyd in
1994, the interrogators were more fixated on Rykener’s “gender transgression and conflation”
than they were on the prisoner’s admitted acts of prostitution or sodomy.22 What was even more
perplexing to the interrogators was that Rykener not only admitted to having had sex “as a
woman” with several men, but also to having “had sex as a man with many women both married
and otherwise.”23 The legal conception of prostitution at the time was highly gendered and, as a
man, Rykener could not be charged with the crime. In fact, as Karras and Boyd’s investigation
shows, John/Eleanor wasn’t even charged with sodomy after the interrogation and was released
shortly after his/her arrest. Rykener’s case shows how sodomy proscriptions in medieval and
early modern Europe was interpreted and criminally enforced heterogeneously.
Sodomy, like prostitution, was also commonly conceived along lines of gender. In one of
his most famous letters to Pope Leo IX, which is commonly known as The Book of Gomorrah,
Damian asked, “Who will make a mistress of a cleric, or a woman of a man?”24 According to
him, performing the submissive role in erotic same-sex acts was equivalent to male-gender
transgression, or a man performing the female gender. While Rykener’s transvestitism was a
physical manifestation of this transgression, John/Eleanor’s interrogators didn’t make the same
connection to sodomy. In medieval London, the gender perfidiousness associated with erotic

22 Karras and Boyd, Loc. 3388. The specific act of sodomy was never put into explicit terms, but it
construed to be either anal or oral sex.
23 Corporation of London Records Office, Plea and Memoranda Roll A34, m. 2 (1395), trans. Ruth Mazo
Karras and David Lorenzo Boyd, in Premodern Sexualities, ed. Louise Fradenburg and Carla Freccero, (New York:
Routledge, 1996), Loc. 3566, Kindle edition.
24 Damian, 15.
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same-sex acts transcended the penetrator/penetrated dichotomy that Damian hinted to in his letter
to the Pope. In their 2011 book, Sex before Sexuality: A Premodern History, medievalist Kim M.
Phillips and early modernist Barry Reay discuss how associated “hierarchies of
penetrator/penetrated, superior/inferior, masculine/feminine and active/passive” were not
accepted in all areas of medieval and early modern Europe.” They further explain that, “This
divide is typically found between southern Europe, where conceiving of erotic same-sex acts
followed in the same vein of Greco-Roman pederasty, and northern Europe, which had no such
distinctions.”25 Being in the latter region, the London interrogators considered not only Rykener
but also his/her lovers implicated in the confession to be complicit in acts of sodomy.
Early sodomy statutes in British colonial America borrowed from those set forth by King
Henry VIII and William Blackstone in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries respectively, using
ambiguous and religiously charged language that could be used to target a number of
transgressions.26 Statutes that criminalized “the detestable and abominable vice of buggery” or
the “crime against nature” as it was “committed with mankind or beast” led to multifarious
interpretations of what constituted an actual act of sodomy. In his 1976 book Sexual Variance in
Society and History, gay historian Vern L. Bullough points out that “between one-fifth and onefourth [of] all prosecutions for sex offenses [were] labeled as sodomy” during Plymouth’s
colonial period, arguing that these offenses were for various acts, including “coitus in ano,
mutual masturbation, and bestiality.”27 Legal historian William N. Eskridge, Jr. claims that the
creation and enforcement of colonial sodomy laws served three goals: [T]o protect vulnerable

25 Phillips and Reay, 70-71.
26 Barnett, 81. King Henry VIII’s statute against sodomy defined the crime as “the detestable and
abominable vice of Buggery committed with mankind or beast,” and Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England described sodomy even more vaguely as the “crime against nature.”
27 Bullough, Sexual Variance, 509.
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persons … from sexual assault … as well as from the seeds of ‘atheism.’ … [T]o protect the
institution of procreative marriage generally. … [And] the maintenance of community purity and
order.”28 While conceptions of sodomy were secularized in the U.S. during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, proscriptions against sodomy seemed to serve the same goals, and they did
so in the same fissured manner as seen in the Plymouth colony.29 The question—and thus the
confusion—remained: what is sodomy?
DEFINING ACTS OF SODOMY IN TEXAS DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Identifying how Texas lawmakers, law enforcement, and judges defined an act of sodomy
is a difficult task for historians. This is because of two main factors: First, there is hardly any
mention of sodomy in legislative documents, and secondly, the majority of court records and
newspaper reports of sodomy cases contain no description of the actual act that was being
prosecuted. Moreover, the lack of recorded sodomy charges in Texas preceding the enactment of
the first sodomy statute in 1860, along with the absence of any discussion regarding the statute’s
addition to the penal code in the state’s first eight legislative sessions, suggest that there was no
precedent for a sodomy proscription in Texas other than the fact that other states in the U.S. had
them in their penal codes. Thirty of the other thirty-two states and three of the six organized
territories in the U.S. at that time already had criminal statutes for sodomy by 1860.30 It is also
possible that adding a sodomy statute to the Texas penal code was the result of a moral
28 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dishonorable Passions: Sodomy Laws in America, 1861-2003 (New York:
Penguin Group, 2008), 18-19.
29 Bullough, Sexual Variance, 496-499.
30Eskridge, 387-407. The enactment of sodomy proscriptions in the other states and territories were as
follows: Alabama, 1841; Arkansas, 1838; California, 1850; Connecticut, 1642; Delaware, 1719; Florida, 1842;
Georgia, 1732; Illinois, 1795; Indiana, 1881; Iowa, 1892; Kansas Territory, 1855; Kentucky, 1792; Louisiana, 1805;
Maine, 1821; Maryland, 1776; Massachusetts, 1641; Michigan, 1816; Minnesota, 1851; Mississippi, 1839;
Missouri, 1835; Nebraska Territory, 1858; New Hampshire, 1679; New Jersey, 1668; New Mexico Territory, 1851;
New York, 1665; North Carolina, 1778; Ohio, 1805; Oklahoma Territory, 1890; Oregon, 1853; Pennsylvania, 1682;
Rhode Island, 1647; South Carolina, 1712; Tennessee, 1829; Utah Territory, 1876; Vermont, 1779; Virginia, 1610;
Washington Territory, 1893; and Wisconsin, 1839.
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obligation assumed by devoutly religious members of the House and Senate Judiciary
committees where the statute was most likely introduced.31 Such a possibility would support
Eskridge’s contention that the mid-to-late 1800s saw a resurgence of Puritan idealism through
the Second Great Awakening in the U.S. As it was during the First Great Awakening in the
colonial period, “the neo-Puritans of the 1860s attempted to defend a legal and moral status quo”
through the endorsement and normalization of a “Bible-based code of conduct.”32 Whatever the
reason for the creation of the first Texas sodomy statute, there is no evidence to suggest that it
was prompted by reports of sodomy taking place in the state.
While there seemed to be no concern exhibited by the Texas legislature about a clear
definition of sodomy, the ambiguous language that the lawmakers used in the 1860 statute
became a concern for state courts. Soon after the statute’s enactment, the judges who presided
over Fennel v. State (1869) and Frazier v. State (1873) ruled that the proscription could not be
enforced because of its lack of clear language and the statute’s failure to define what constituted
a “crime against nature.” The basis for these rulings lay in articles six and nine of the penal code,
which together required “the clear import of the words of a law” for a criminal statute to not be
regarded as “wholly inoperable.”33 But following a legislative revision of the Texas penal code
in 1879, which removed the necessity for crimes to be “expressly defined” in order to prosecute
them, the courts were enabled to rely on both common law and judges’ own interpretations of

31 Correspondence, 2D105-2D106, Benjamin Holland Epperson Papers, 1834-1876; Correspondence,
2D162-2D163, 2D165, Benjamin Cromwell Franklin Papers, 1805-1915; Correspondence, 2F41-2F42, Roger
Quarles Mills Papers, 1813-1938; Correspondence, 2K163, Isaiah Addison Paschal Papers, 1844-1870;
Correspondence, 2H28-2H29, James Webb Throckmorton Papers, 1838-1888; Correspondence, 2R299-2R300,
Louis Trezvant Wigfall Papers, 1833-1874, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas,
Austin. While the personal correspondence of Epperson et al. contains no references to the creation or enforcement
of the 1860 sodomy statute, it does show how their Christian faith and religious rhetoric were an important part of
their daily lives.
32 Eskridge, 16, 23.
33 Fennel v. State, 32 Tex. 378 (1869) and Frazier v. State, 39 Tex. 390 (1873), as cited by Bullough,
Sexual Variance, 578, and Moore, 241n; Penal Code, Texas, 3.
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sodomy. Unlike the rulings in Fennel and Frazier, Ex Parte Bergen (1883) confirmed a sodomy
conviction, citing the recent legislative change. Coincidently, neither the specific act which was
dubbed “sodomy” in Bergen nor its criminal nature was included in the court record.34
Despite the lack of specificity found in court records and newspaper accounts of sodomy
cases in the nineteenth century, there is enough evidence to show that Texas courts interpreted
the crime of sodomy to consist of at least two different acts. The first known Texas sodomy case,
Campbell v. State (1866), described the committed offense as “a crime against nature” with a
mare. There were no details about the specific act that Warren Campbell had committed with the
mare, but it can be determined that it was sexual, or rather, an act of bestiality.35 There were at
least two other cases of sodomy in Texas courts during the nineteenth century that dealt with acts
of bestiality, thereby making the act the most commonly reported type of sodomy as well as
inscribing into the legal record one of the many acts incorporated under the shadow of sodomy’s
legacy of confusion.36
The second act which Texas courts interpreted as an act of sodomy was a matter of legal
contention. Nineteenth-century understandings of sodomy in the rest of the U.S. included such
acts as anal sex, bestiality, and even masturbation. Including oral sex under the umbrella term of
sodomy, however, was not as easily accepted. This issue was addressed for the first time in
Texas by Prindle v. State (1893). Charilie Prindle was arrested and convicted for forcing a child
to commit an act of oral sex upon him. The arresting lawman and the court that secured the
conviction believed that oral sex constituted an act of sodomy. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals disagreed, however. The presiding judge began his decision for the court by giving the

34 Ex Parte Bergen, 14 Tex. Crim. App. 52 (1883).
35 State v. Campbell, 29 Tex. 44 (1867), as cited in Katz, Love Stories, 360n.
36 Moore, 241n.
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common law definition of sodomy and then explained why it could not be related to the
conviction and sentence of Prindle:
‘This offense consists in the carnal knowledge committed against the order of nature by
man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman; or by man or woman, in
any manner, with beast.’…Sodomy, which ‘is the abominable and detestable crime
against nature,’ known to the common law, is, by article 342 of the Penal Code, made an
‘offense’ in this State…The evidence discloses the act relied on in this case was
committed in a child’s mouth. However vile and detestable the act proved may be, and is,
it can constitute no offense, because not contemplated by the statute, and is not embraced
in the crime of sodomy.37
The court’s decision immediately affected other Texas courts of law deciding on cases that
involved a charge of sodomy. That same year, a criminal case against two men in San Antonio,
who were charged with sodomy and aggravated assault for an unspecified act against a young
boy, was dismissed “owing to a recent decision of the Criminal Court of Appeals [in Prindle v.
State] affecting cases of this character.” One of the men charged pled guilty to the count of
aggravated assault and was charged a twenty-five dollar fine.38 If oral sex was understood as an
act of sodomy by law enforcement, it was no longer prosecutable as such in the court of law,
even when committed as a forceful act against a child. Moreover, there were no criminal statutes
against child molestation at the time.
Despite the appeals granted in Fennel, Frazier, and Prindle, the Texas legislature made
no revision to the 1860 sodomy statute until 1943. In 1874, following Fennel and Frazier, a
legislative bill was proposed in the State Senate to require the Judiciary Committee “to report a
bill defining more clearly the offences of sodomy, adultery, and fornication,” and two years after
the 1893 decision in Prindle, a House bill was introduced “to classify sodomy according to
degree and provide for the punishment thereof.” No action was taken in pushing either bill

37 Prindle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App. 551 (1893).
38 San Antonio Daily Light July 7, 1893, 8; San Antonio Daily Express, November 19, 1893, 6.
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through the legislature, and the House and Senate journals give no indication why.39 Moreover,
in the Report of the Attorney General of the State of Texas for the Years 1893-94, Texas Attorney
General Charles A. Culberson made no mention of the crime of sodomy or even the Prindle
decision.40 The lack of concern exhibited by the Texas Legislature in clarifying exactly what
constituted an act of sodomy during the nineteenth century directly affected the court’s ability to
secure convictions. Furthermore, while court records indicate that law enforcement and judges
understood at least two different acts (bestiality and oral sex) as sodomy, the courts made no
attempts to specifically define an act of sodomy in writing, thus contributing to a continuation of
sodomy’s legacy of confusion.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND THE GENDER OF SODOMY
The varied interpretations of what exactly constituted an act of sodomy during the
nineteenth century in Texas makes it difficult likewise to define the criminal nature of sodomy as
it was conceived during this period. Jonathan Katz describes one interpretation of the “crime
against nature” in relation to a more recent understanding of sodomy:
Judicial practice and tradition constituted a bestiality/sodomy connection, a historically
specific association of human-beast mating and men’s anal intercourse with other
humans. That linking seems strange only to readers who grew up in the twentieth century,
after the homo/hetero divide – the mass dissemination of a new, gender-divided, erotic
system called homosexuality and heterosexuality. Under the epochal new ordering and
naming of sexuality (within that same-sex/different sex arrangement of eros) humanbeast intercourse and the anal intercourse of humans were thought of as essentially
different sorts of acts. The nineteenth-century distinction between procreative and
nonprocreative closely linked its bestiality cases to those involving men’s sexual relations
with human males, females, and children.41

39 Galveston Daily News, February 13, 1874, 1; January 15, 1895, 4.
40 Charles A. Culberson, Report of the Attorney General of the State of Texas for the Years 1893-94
(Austin: Ben C. Jones & Co., 1895), 3. Despite Culberson’s concern for the “marked increase of crime” between
1893 and 1895, the detailed appendices to his report made no reference to the number of arrests, indictments, or
convictions for the crime of sodomy.
41 Katz, Love Stories, 64.
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Similar to Katz’s contention, William Eskridge and the CATO Institute’s Robert A. Levy state in
an Amicus Curiae brief for the petitioners in Lawrence v Texas (2003) that the main “purpose of
nineteenth century sodomy laws was protection of children, women, and weaker men against
sexual assault.”42 As the decision in Prindle v. State (1893) shows, however, the 1860 Texas
sodomy statute did not protect children. Moreover, the assertion that sodomy was conceived of
as an act of sexual violence was not necessarily reflected in the statute’s place in the Texas penal
code. Sodomy was initially included in Title XII of the penal code, which was reserved for
crimes against “public morals, decency, and chastity,” such as miscegenation, incest, adultery,
prostitution, and indecent exposure, while criminal statutes concerning rape, assault, and other
violent crimes were included in Title XVII, “crimes against the person of an individual.”43
Another way that interpreting sodomy as a form of sexual assault in Texas can be problematized
is by observing how victims were defined.
The early Texas penal code exhibited legislators’ acute concerns about regulating sexual
behavior among the state’s citizens during the nineteenth century. “The traditional attitudes of
American culture,” according to Barnett, “make monogamous heterosexual marriage the moral
norm, and all expressions of sexuality outside that institution morally deviant.”44 These same
moral attitudes were reified in the Texas Penal Code in several sections, including Title XII. At
the penal code’s initial inception in 1857, Title XII included proscriptions for the following
offences: “unlawful marriage,” including bigamy and interracial marriage; “incest and adultery,”
with the definition of adultery extending to premarital cohabitation; “disorderly houses,” or
brothels; and “indecent exhibitions and publications,” criminalizing public exposure and any
42 “Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,” Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S.
558 (2003), 11, accessed October 1, 2014, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-102/02102.mer.ami.ci.pdf.
43 Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, Vol. IV, 1458-1459.
44 Barnett, 1.
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“print, picture, or written composition, manifestly designed to corrupt the morals of youth.”

45

Along with these proscriptions, statutes concerning rape, assault with intent to rape, and even
abortion, were included in the section concerning “crimes against the person of an individual,”
and statutes concerning seduction were included in the section reserved for “miscellaneous
offences.”46 While on the surface these criminal statutes seem to be aimed at controlling sexual
behavior in Texas, a deeper look shows that the major concern of these proscriptions was the
control of women’s bodies. In her book Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border,
Gender and Women’s Studies scholar Eithne Luibhéid describes how “women’s bodies
historically serve as the iconic sites for sexual intervention by state and nation-making
projects.”47 While her study focuses on the control of sexuality through the “immigration control
apparatus” in the U.S. from the late nineteenth century to well into the twentieth, Luibhéid’s
approach to interpreting the language and enforcement of laws targeting specific expressions of
sexuality extends to that of the Texas Penal Code in the nineteenth century as well.
Examples of how criminal statutes directed toward sexual behavior were highly gendered
can be found in those dealing with seduction and rape. The statutory proscription for seduction
applied to any man who, if “by promise to marry, shall seduce an unmarried female, under the
age of twenty-five years, and shall have carnal knowledge of such female.”48 Not only was
seduction a crime in which only a woman could be victimized, but the statute of limitation in
charges of seduction was oddly set at “twenty-five years.” In addition, a specific clause was
45 Penal Code, TX (1857). For unlawful marriage, see 71-72, Art. 384-387, Ch. I, Title XII; incest and
adultery, see 72-73, Art. 388-395, Ch. II, Title XII; disorderly houses, see 74, Art. 396-398, Ch. III, Title XII; and
indecent exhibitions and publications, see 74, Art. 399, Ch. IV, Title XII.
46 Ibid. For assault with intent to rape, see 97 Art. 493, Ch. III, Title XVII; rape, see 102-103, Art. 523530, Ch. VI, Title XVII; abortion, see 103-104, Art. 531-536, Ch. VII, Title XVII; and seduction, see 155-156, Art.
788-791, Ch. III, Title XXI (Art. 791 in Ch. III is incorrectly numbered as Art. 781).
47 Eithne Luibhéid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2002), xi.
48 Penal Code, TX (1857), 155, Art. 788, Ch. III, Title XXI.
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provided in Article 791 removing liability from married men who committed the crime of
seduction if it could be proven that the victimized woman had prior knowledge of the man’s
marriage.49 Similar to the statutes for seduction, the language used in the proscriptions for rape
singled out women as the only possible victim of the crime, stating that, “Rape is the carnal
knowledge of a woman without her consent, obtained by force, threats, or fraud.” Also similar to
the articles on seduction, the articles on rape included certain clauses that nullified liability. First,
the age of a rape victim’s consent was set at ten years old. “[T]he carnal knowledge of a female
under the age of ten years” would be prosecuted as rape regardless of consent “and with or
without the use of force, threats or fraud.” This meant that a girl as young as ten years old would
have to give herself over to medical and courtroom examinations in order to prove that she had
been raped, which was an ordeal that could be an incredibly intimidating and horrifying
experience for a woman of any age. As such, this clause could have easily worked in an
offender’s favor. Secondly, any male under the age of fourteen could not be held liable for
rape.50 This liability clause exposes the incongruity of nineteenth-century gender expectations in
Texas, suggesting that a female’s innocence becomes suspect four years before a male’s.
The statutes concerning seduction and rape in the early Texas penal code not only
construct a gendered idea of who can be a victim of sexual assault, but they also reveal who can
be a perpetrator of such a crime. This construction is highlighted by historian Nayan Shah in his
discussion of similar statutes in California at the time. In his book Stranger Intimacy: Contesting
Race, Sexuality and the Law in the North American West, Shah claims that, “Underwriting the
new age standards that defined consensual sex between males and females was a conventional
understanding of gender that naturalized male aggression in contrast with female
49 Ibid., 156, Art. 791, Ch. III, Title XXI.
50 Ibid., 102, Art. 523, and 103, Art. 528, Ch. VI, Art. XVII.
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vulnerability.”51 Positing this gender relationship as the basis for crimes of sexual assault lends
itself to the construction of a male-aggressor/female-victim dichotomy, and in so doing, it
complicates the idea that sodomy was construed as a form of sexual violence in the nineteenth
century. This is because sex was construed narrowly as penile/vaginal intercourse, and any
contact of sexual organs outside of “natural” sex was seen as unnatural, or more specifically,
unsexual. Moreover, there is only one sodomy case from the nineteenth century which involved a
female victim.52 It would have been difficult for nineteenth-century officials to conceive of a
man being the victim of sexual assault because, as historian Stephen Robertson suggests in his
2010 article in the Journal of the History of Sexuality, “only women could be raped, and no
parallel statutes existed that applied to sexual assaults on men or same-sex acts.”53
It seems that one of the two most common victims of the crime of sodomy were people
who weren’t actually involved in the act. Eskridge writes that, “Many sodomy prosecutions have
involved sexual activities that disturbed the peace because they shocked ‘innocent’ observers.”54
For example, the legal victims in acts of bestiality would have been the passersby who saw the
crime take place. Another example of such victimization in a sodomy case was reported in the
San Antonio Daily Light in 1893. In late July of that year, two men were observed engaged in “a
horrible crime against nature” inside a San Antonio residence they had illegally entered. The two
men were initially booked for disorderly conduct, but upon appearing before the court recorder
the morning after the arrest, charges of sodomy were filed against them and their case was
transferred to the San Antonio Justice Court. Unable to pay the 500-dollar bonds they were
51 Nayan Shah, Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality, and the Law in the North American West
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), Kindle ed., Loc. 2654.
52 Lewis v. the State, 36 Tex. Crim. App. 37 (1896), accessed May 1, 2016, https://casetext.com/case/
lewis-v-the-state-31.
53 Stephen Robertson, “Shifting the Scene of the Crime: Sodomy and the American History of Sexual
Violence,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 19.2 (2010):225.
54 Eskridge, 4.
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given, the two men remained in jail until their charges ended up being dismissed at trial seven
months later.55 Given that the court’s decision to dismiss the case happened shortly after Prindle
v. State (1893) was decided, it is possible to suggest that the specific act of sodomy here was that
of oral sex, but this cannot be confirmed with the lack of details. The other most common
victims in nineteenth-century sodomy cases in Texas tended to be children. This fact also makes
defining both the criminal nature and the act of sodomy problematic because, firstly, there was
no statute criminalizing child molestation at the time, and secondly, the details surrounding most
of the cases in which an act of sodomy was committed against a youth are scant.56 Therefore,
charges of sodomy with a child could have been made for any number of specific acts.
REDEFINING SODOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
It would take fifty years following the decision in Prindle v. State (1893) to ease the
doubt cast over sodomy convictions in Texas. There were a total of thirty-two appeals cases
heard in Texas courts that made at least some mention of sodomy in them between 1893 and
1943. Of those cases, twenty-six of them were actual appeals to sodomy convictions. This
number is striking considering that there were only eight appeals to sodomy convictions in Texas
during the nineteenth century. The confusion surrounding what constituted an act of sodomy had
evolved into contestation. This increase in the number of appeals cases also marks a rise in the
legal discourse surrounding sodomy in Texas. Most importantly, one of the first cases in this list
produced the very first explicit definition of what constituted an act of sodomy. Writing for the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Lewis v. State (1896), Judge Henderson affirmed Alex
Lewis’s conviction for the crime of sodomy committed against a woman. In doing so, the judge

55 San Antonio Daily Light July 26, 1893, 8; July 27, 1893, 1; February 21, 1894, 4.
56 Galveston Daily News, February 11, 1884, n.p.; March 20, 1884, n.p.; February 3, 1885, 6; Laredo
Times, January 31, 1886, 3; Prindle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App. 551 (1893).
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gave a definition for sodomy in charging that Lewis “copulated with a woman by penetrating her
fundament or anus with his penis.”57 This decision does not mark an end to the confusion,
however. Rather, it marks a rift in the legal discourse surrounding sodomy by introducing a new,
more specific language to sodomy’s legacy in Texas.
The new precedent for specificity affected sodomy convictions in Texas, but not in a
uniform manner. Giving utterance to the details that judges perceived as “revolting” or
“gruesome” in appeals cases didn’t always ensure conviction as they did in Lewis. In Mullins v.
State (1903) the appellant was contesting a sodomy conviction for an alleged act of bestiality
with a dog. The two witnesses to the act gave explicit testimony of seeing the act take place, but
they could not confirm seeing the appellant’s “private parts” during the alleged act. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the previous judgement due to an “insufficiency of
evidence.”58 Two years later, the same court heard a similar appeals case involving a conviction
for an alleged act of bestiality with a hog. In Langford v. State (1905), the three witnesses gave
an even greater detailed account than that in Mullins: “Each testify that they saw appellant with
his pants unbuttoned and his penis erect; he would get on the sow and kinder hunch or go
through the motion as if copulating. When appellant would begin his motions, the sow would
move up, and he would scratch her sides, and she would stop.” Unlike the previous case, the
witnesses testified to seeing the appellant’s penis, but the court still ruled that there was an
insufficient amount of evidence to secure conviction without witnessing the actual penetration of
the hog.59

57 Lewis v. the State, 36 Tex. Crim. App. 37 (1896).
58 Mullins v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. App. 465 (1903).
59 Langford v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. App. 561 (1905).
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Aside from introducing a specific conception of what constituted an act of sodomy into
the sodomitical discourse in Texas, the decision in Lewis v. State (1896) created another
precedent which affected the understanding of sodomy’s criminal nature. The victim in Lewis
was a woman and, as stated above, the nineteenth-century interpretation of victimhood in crimes
of sexual assault was highly gendered. In this instance, therefore, the criminal nature of sodomy
was conceived as sexual assault. The language which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals chose
in commenting on this fact, however, held implications for sodomy cases in which men were
victimized. Citing Lewis in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Adams v. State
(1905), the presiding judge asserted that whether the victim was “a male or female, the
copulation being against the order of nature, such carnal knowledge would not be in the usual
way, and would therefore constitute the crime of sodomy.” This assertion countered the
appellant’s basis for appeal, which was that the indictment for sodomy omitted an important
detail regarding the sex of the victim. The appellant posited his appeal upon the gendered
conception of sodomy. He claimed that his indictment did not designate the sex of the victim
and, since the victim’s name could be attributed to either the female or male sex, the conviction
was null and void based on the absence of a real victim. The court’s decision did more than
quash the appellant’s argument: it set a precedent that rendered victims of sodomy genderless.60
Regardless of how an act or the criminal nature of sodomy was conceptualized after
Prindle v. State (1893), one fact was clear: there was a marked increase in arrests for sodomy in
Texas during the early twentieth century. The dozens of reports of sodomy arrests found in Texas
newspapers were less specific in describing the acts performed or the nature of the crimes than
the court records, but there was enough said about sodomy to reflect some continuity between
60 Adams v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. App. 90 (1905).
.
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: The majority of sodomy charges before 1943 were made
for alleged acts of bestiality and assaults against children. The problem, however, was that the
legal precedent set by Mullins v. State (1903) in requiring more specificity to legitimate bestiality
charges, and by Prindle v. State (1893) in considering acts of oral sex—even when children were
forced to perform them—rendered the 1860 Texas sodomy statute practically unenforceable.
Even upon a complete revision of the Texas penal code in 1925, as Judge Hawkins of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals stated in the court’s decision in Munoz v. State (1926), “The
[sodomy] law has not been amended but instead has been reenacted in the same language as
originally found.” This showed another continuity between nineteenth and twentieth century
sodomy cases: a lack of concern about a clearer sodomy statute exhibited by Texas lawmakers
countered with the overt concern expressed by judges. In the same decision, Judge Hawkins
claimed that, “[I]n many States where a similar law to ours on the subject of sodomy had
received a like construction as ours the legislature of those States amended the law and extended
the definition beyond the common law meaning so it would embrace acts shown in the present
case.” Without amending the statute in the penal code’s 1925 revision, the court was forced to
reverse the conviction for an act of oral sex in Munoz.61
By 1943, the frequency of sodomy arrests combined with the amount of sodomy
convictions reversed in appeals cases led Texas lawmakers to declare an emergency in the state’s
forty-eighth legislature. On January 20, 1943 House Representative Joe Carrington of Midland
proposed House Bill 36, “An Act amending Article 524, Revised Penal Code of the State of
Texas, to define Sodomy and to fix the penalty therefor; and declaring an emergency.”62 Upon
the bill’s second reading two months later, Rep. Carrington provided the Judiciary Committee’s
61 Munoz v. State, 103 Tex. Crim. App. 439 (1926).
62 Journal of the House, Forty-Eighth Leg., Texas, 106.
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amended version. The first section of the bill gave a detailed definition for criminal acts of
sodomy, including bestiality, same- and opposite-sex anal or oral intercourse, and using “sexual
parts in a lewd or lascivious manner” with a minor. This new language inscribed the discourse
that had surrounded sodomy in Texas for decades, directly relating to the issues that had been
raised in Mullins v. State (1903), Lewis v. State (1905), and Prindle v. State (1893). In addition to
this, the revised bill provided a constitutional exception regarding the passing of the bill:
The fact that the present law does not sufficiently define sodomy, and the further fact that
this vile crime is all too prevalent in our State, creates an emergency and an imperative
public necessity that the constitutional rule requiring that bills be read on three several
days in each House be suspended, and said rule is hereby suspended, and that this Act
shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so enacted.63
The threat of sodomy had suddenly become so great that the Judiciary Committee created a
clause that would streamline the bill through the constitutionally defined legislative process. The
bill was passed that day and from it began a new era of sodomy prohibition, which exhibited the
same sense of urgency as its decree.

The confused and contested discourse that surrounded the 1860 Texas sodomy statute and
its enforcement were rooted in a centuries-long legacy of multiple conceptions of the term, act,
and crime of sodomy. This legacy was both in response to and a perpetuation of the interminable
question, What is sodomy? Etymologically, sodomy is the sin of Sodom. Theologians within the
early Christian church did not come to a consensus as to what the sin of Sodom constituted
specifically, however. Rather, they shaped a multifarious discourse that joined sodomy with
“unnatural acts” inside a realm of sexual deviance that included several different types of acts
from anal sex to intercourse in an improper position. As sodomy prohibitions became secularized

63 Ibid., 931.
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in Europe during the late medieval and early modern periods, the list of possible acts that fit
under the umbrella terms of sodomy or unnatural acts multiplied and included nonsexual acts
with sexual ones. This led to ambiguously worded criminal statutes that were broad enough to
cover the multiplicity of acts dubbed sodomy. The most influential of these criminal sodomy
statutes in Anglo North America were those penned by King Henry VIII and Sir William
Blackstone, and many of the states in the U.S., including Texas, inherited their ambiguous
language.
In 1860, the Texas Legislature enacted the state’s first sodomy statute, ignoring a legal
requirement to use clear language in state penal statutes. The statute’s waffling enforcement
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries increasingly revealed a dissimilitude
in how the act and criminal nature of sodomy were interpreted by law enforcement, judges, and
legislators. Whereas a lawman might arrest a man for an act of oral sex, a judge would feel
compelled to dismiss the charge because the act wasn’t explicitly covered under the state sodomy
statute. Legislators, on the other hand, didn’t chime in until sodomy had reached an “emergency”
status in 1943, replacing the 1860 statute with a more explicit statute that defined acts of
sodomy. The only act that was agreed upon in the legal record as an act of sodomy prior to 1943
was bestiality, but even these seemingly open and shut cases were harder to prosecute without
witnesses providing an uncomfortable degree of details to the act. The criminal nature of sodomy
was likewise a matter of contention. Whereas historians have noted that sodomy was often
understood as a form of sexual violence in the nineteenth century, this created a legal paradox
given the gendered nature of the Texas Penal Code: men couldn’t be raped and women couldn’t
be sodomized. The ambiguous language used in the 1860 sodomy statute coupled with the
multifarious interpretations of what constituted sodomy negatively affected the statute’s
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enforcement before 1943. But this history of the 1860 sodomy statute and its enforcement in the
nineteenth and twentieth century is incomplete.
While this discordant discourse surrounding sodomy in Texas plagued successful
prosecutions of sodomy charges, it did not necessarily create a stalemate or spell of inactivity
regarding the proscription against sodomy in the state. Instead, it led to the production of an
increasingly overt and varied sodomitical discourse within Texas newspaper reports, court
records, and legislative documents, consisting of both silence and clamor, ambiguity and
specificity, indifference and hysteria. The next chapter will show that it was from this discursive
context, as it intersected with equally problematic social constructions of gender, race, and
sexuality, that the sodomitical Other was constructed in Texas during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
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3. Constructing the Sodomitical Other in Texas, 1860-1973
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only
weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure,
forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which
runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is
repression.
—Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977

In the March 2, 1946 edition of the Port Arthur News, evangelist Ed Holt made a plea to
the youth in his community. Holt begged young boys and girls to cover their nakedness in order
to “save the world from sodomy.” Specifically, he was addressing the increased attention toward
human sexuality in popular culture at the time, suggesting that “such things [would bring] the
wrath of God upon the children of disobedience.”1 The following year, a record number of
arrests made on charges of sodomy were reported in Texas newspapers. Of the fifteen arrests
reported in eight different newspapers in 1947, six were for acts of sodomy committed against
minors, one was included in a case of assault with attempt to rape, and eight gave no details as to
the act committed or the nature of the crime.2 That same year, a legislative committee
investigation into the conditions at Texas prisons found that, “Every form of perversion is
practiced [in the prisons] all the time.” House Representative Sam Sellers of Waco was quoted
on the front page of the August 28, 1947 edition of the Big Spring Daily Herald as saying that
“some inmates are ‘treated worse than animals’ and [he] described sodomy and self-mutilation as

1 Edd Holt, “The Great Controversy,” Port Arthur News, 2 March 1946, 2.
2 Amarillo Daily News, June 13, 1947, 20; August 12, 1947, 14; October 17, 1947, 7; December 2, 1947, 1;
Amarillo Globe, August 6, 1947, 10; October 30, 1947, 7; November 13, 1947, 28; Brownsville Herald, February 5,
1947, 1; April 7, 1947, 9; April 10, 1947, 17; June 13, 1947, 13; November 9, 1947, 7; November 12, 1947, 10;
Denton Record Chronicle, July 6, 1947, 2; October 29, 1947, 1; El Paso Herald Post, July 21, 1947, 4; Galveston
Daily News, April 26, 1947, 3; May 1, 1947, 6; July 10, 1947, 2; Paris News, May 2, 1947, 10; May 4, 1947, 8; May
22, 1947, 16; San Antonio Express, April 23, 1947, 7; May 5, 1947, 16.
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‘regular and consistent.’”3 Despite the enactment of the state’s second sodomy statute in 1943,
which gave a clearer yet no less multifarious definition of the crime than its predecessor, sodomy
was as much of an “utterly confused category” as it had been for centuries.4 But it was more
important for legislators, law enforcement, judges, and laymen alike to define the type of
individual who would commit such a crime than it was to define the crime itself.
The 1860 and 1943 Texas sodomy statutes served as constructive tools of power in the
assignation of Otherness to various individuals and groups. This was not despite the statutes’
ambiguities, but rather because of them. In her examination of twentieth-century federal policies
regarding homosexuality, Margot Canaday similarly argues that the federal government’s “vague
devices,” working in conjunction with “explicit prohibitions” helped to “constitute
homosexuality” as a state-constructed status that was opposite to not just heterosexuality, but
also “first-class citizenship.”5 The construction of the sodomitical Other in Texas during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was also dependent upon the multiple discourses surrounding
other social constructions in the state. In an interview published in Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Public Writings, 1972-1977, Michel Foucault discussed this dependence in
relation to state power:
[R]elations of power … necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State. In two senses:
first of all because the State … is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual
power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other
already existing power relations. The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series
of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge,
technology and so forth.6

3 Big Spring Daily Herald, August 28, 1947, 1.
4 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 101.
5 Canaday, 173, 169.
6 Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon,
trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 122.
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Considering first that sodomy proscriptions were used as a tool of power in regulating the
function of bodies, and secondly that regulatory power in Texas was constituted in social
constructions of race and gender, then the construction of the sodomitical Other through the
Texas sodomy statutes was based on understandings of gender as a binary construction and race
as a hierarchical one.
This chapter explores the ways in which some men were constructed as an Other through
the shifting interpretations and enforcement of the Texas sodomy statutes. I argue that an
imaginary model of anticitizenship was constructed at the discursive intersection of historical
misunderstandings of sodomy, shifting ideas about gender, race, and sexuality, and the fearful
imaginings of an anxious public propagated by institutions of power which had a hand in
defining the parameters of citizenship. The sodomitical Other was as multifarious as the acts
used in its construction, being posited as antitheses to shifting threats to State power. The first
section in this chapter describes how the 1860 sodomy statute was used in the making of a
racialized sodomitical Other, basing such a construction on existing ideas about gender and race
in Texas. The second section explains how the pathological “homosexual” was constructed in
nineteenth-century Europe, and how that construction was understood differently by lawmakers
in the United States and Texas during the early-to-mid twentieth century. The third section
describes how the previous confusion surrounding the nature of sodomy and the legal efforts to
define it led to a conflation of criminal and sexual identities which was imposed on
“homosexual” bodies by a fearful public during the Cold War, and the last section describes how
this new construction was first contested in federal and state courts, but then reified in the 1973
homosexual conduct statutes.
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GENDER, RACE, AND OTHERNESS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Gender has been used as a tool of state power and state-making at several points in the
history of the United States. Women’s historian Joan Wallach Scott defines gender as “the
knowledge of sexual difference” in her book Gender and the Politics of History, and she claims
that the ways in which gender is used and defined “become contested politically and are the
means by which relationships of power—of domination and subordination—are constructed.”7 In
her book, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture, Americanist Amy Kaplan
similarly argues that femininity and masculinity both played large roles in the shaping and
deployment of U.S. imperial projects both abroad and at home. Furthermore, U.S. historian Gail
Bederman joins Kaplan in noting the ways in which this gender dynamic relates directly to race
in the construction of the U.S. state in her book, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History
of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917.

8

These connections between gender and

domination, imperialism, racialization, and state-making are also found in the early history of the
state of Texas.
One connection between gender and state-making can be found in a brief article entitled
“Life on the Rio Grande” that was published in the midst of the U.S.-Mexico War in the April
1847 edition of Godey’s Lady’s Book. Before peace was even formally drawn between the two
North American nations, the article remarked at the quick and immense growth of “American
colonists” in the state of Texas since its 1845 annexation into the U.S. “[W]ith more than two
hundred thousand inhabitants,” the writer exclaimed, “[and] a list of the post-offices now
established in Texas—one hundred and nineteen,” the Texas frontier seemed to be a fertile land,

7 Scott, 2.
8 Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2002), 4, 18; Bederman, 5.
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ripe for reproduction in colonial terms.9 The article and illustration are examples of how,
according to Kaplan, the nineteenth-century “language of domesticity permeated representations
of national expansion.”10 The frontier was a living space destined for American domesticity. To
achieve such a domestic status, however, the frontier had to go through a violent transformation,
which was only possible through its conquest. Therefore, a contradictory relationship was drawn
between masculinity and domesticity in relation to the Texas frontier during the nineteenth
century.
This gendered contradiction can be seen in a second example from Godey’s Lady’s Book.
Another allusion to the borderlands was made in the periodical as part of chapter seven from Ups
and Downs in Old Virginia, a serial novel written by Penny Patch. Narrated from the perspective
of a mid-nineteenth-century Virginia debutante, Miss Frazer, the chapter exemplifies VictorianEra ideals of proper gender roles in high-class American society. Among Miss Frazer’s several
suitors is Captain Brandon, an officer in the U.S. army who Miss Frazer describes as “a hero of
the Rio Grande.” In a dialogue between the two characters, Captain Brandon discusses his
personal encounter with “the fair Mexicans; their jetty locks; their bright, sloey black eyes; their
ruby lips, as they are poutingly entwined around the fragrant cigaritto; their dainty feet….[T]hey
unite all that is lovely in woman. They are the angels of light … across that land of fierce misrule
and hopeless anarchy.”11 Through highly gendered terms, this fictionalized account of an
American soldier reflecting on his meeting with beautiful Mexican women both romanticizes and
emasculates Mexican culture. The Mexican damsel in distress can only be saved from the
turmoil of the frontier by the gentlemanly American soldier “at whose command your patriotism
9 “Life on the Rio Grande,” Godey’s Lady’s Book 34 (April 1847): 177.
10 Kaplan, 27.
11 Penny Patch, Ups and Downs in Old Virginia, Chapter VII, Godey’s Lady’s Book 36 (June 1848): 325326.
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burns or chills; who holds men’s hearts, as it were, in chains; … who builds them up into stern,
resolute men, or makes them as docile children in his hands.”12
There are two visions of colonizing the borderlands in these examples from Godey’s
Lady’s Book. In the latter example, the frontier is populated by Mexicans willing to allow state
military intervention and, ultimately, the introduction of American civilization and the
domestication of their disorderly homeland. In the former example, the frontier is wide open,
uninhabited, and a natural space for the penetration and reproduction of American dreams. Both
visions exhibit what Kaplan calls “a process of domestication, which entails conquering and
taming the wild, the natural, and the alien.”13 Moreover, this same discourse of civilization
invoked in other texts, leading Bederman to suggest that “the interesting thing about
‘civilization’ is not what was meant by the term, but the multiple ways it was used to legitimize
different sorts of claims to power.”14 This suggestion relates directly to the colonization and
development of Texas during the nineteenth century, as well as to the dual nature of gender:
Both pliable and static, the knowledge of sexual difference could be used to characterize such
state projects as colonization, war, or nationalism at the same time that that characterization
depended on the fixity of a biological or natural gender binary. This was not the only ideology
that was integral to state power and construction in nineteenth-century Texas, however. Not only
is the relationship of gender and domination similar to the nineteenth-century dynamic of a racial
hierarchy in Texas, it is also related.
Ideas about race and gender in the nineteenth-century U.S. were inextricably linked.
Furthermore, these ideas were rooted in fears of the contamination and emasculation of the white

12 Ibid., 327-328.
13 Kaplan, 25.
14 Bederman, 23.
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race. Bederman summarizes the dominant ideology at the time: “[W]hen late nineteenth-century
Americans began to synthesize new formulations of gender, hegemonic discourses of civilization
explained concisely the precise relation between the male body, male identity, and male
authority. White male bodies had evolved through centuries of Darwinistic survival of the
fittest.”15 In this ideology, nonwhite peoples were naturally prone to poverty, perversion, and
crime. For example, Texas Attorney General Clark surmised as to why there had been a marked
increase in crime across the state in his 1874 annual report:
[M]ore than three hundred thousand slaves, subject for life to constant restraint and
supervision, were turned loose as free citizens, subject to no control save their own
debased caprices. Unacquainted with the laws, and pampered by designing men with the
idea of a peculiar favoritism toward them on the part of the government, it was but
natural for many of them daily to commit offenses, and to furnish the largest percentage
of our prison and penitentiary inmates.16
As it was with the relationship of state power and gender, white supremacy was dependent on a
static and scientifically rooted hierarchy of race in the nineteenth-century U.S., placing
predominantly Protestant, Anglo Saxon white men at the top and often lumping “nonwhites” into
one category of inferiority. Perceived threats to the stability of such a hierarchy, however, such
as the end of the institution of slavery following the Civil War and the increasing ethnic diversity
in the industrial workforce, brought anxieties about the vitality of white supremacy to the surface
in newspapers, court records, and government documents. The resulting “rhetoric of empire,” as
it is termed by literary analyst David Spurr, was also evident in reports of sodomy cases in Texas
during the nineteenth century.17

15 Ibid., 42.
16 Galveston Daily News, December 24, 1874, n.p.
17 Jacobson, 110. Jacobson identifies what Spurr calls “rhetoric of empire” as the “recurring linguistic
patterns and choices … in travelogues, novels, journalistic pieces, or the administrative writing of colonial
bureaucrats” which reflect the “dominant assumptions and values” about the “various social and political practices
associated with a policy of imperialism.”
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There is a tendency in many Texas court records and newspaper reports from the
nineteenth century to identify people of color as an explicit Other to whiteness. While some men
were clearly identified as “negro,” “colored,” or “Mexican” when they were charged for crimes,
there was no such distinction for white, and presumably Protestant, men.

18

Similarly, the

language used about men of color charged with sodomy was far more inflammatory than that
used for white men charged with the same crimes. For every white man who was arrested for,
charged with, or convicted of sodomy, Texas newspapers rarely reported the details of the cases,
and in the instances that they did, they were done without any rhetorical inflection of
condemnation. For nonwhites, however, such adjectives as “bestial,” “brutal,” and “horrible”
were used to describe the accused or their crime. The most explicit example of this incendiary
rhetoric is found in an 1886 Laredo Times report:
A brute named Esteban, surname unknown, was jailed to day [sic] for committing the
beastial [sic] crime of sodomy. The victim is a thirteen year old boy. The statute covering
the offence is so dubious that tears are entertained that the court of Appeals will reverse
the conviction sure to be had here, provided evidence shows up. Such a wretch should be
emasculated, and transported out of the country.19
According to the author of this brief report, the man’s alleged crime was so severe that it
warranted his exclusion from both the male gender (through castration) and U.S. citizenship,
highlighting white male anxieties related to the permanence of a necessarily ordered gender
binary and racial hierarchy.
While many of the reports on sodomy cases like the one above have no follow-up reports
in newspapers and are often buried in or entirely disappeared from court records, the available
evidence is still able to reflect that sentences for sodomy convictions in the nineteenth century
18 See, for example: Campbell v. State, 29 Tex. 44 (1869) (“Warren Campbell, a freedman of color”);
Galveston Daily News, April 5, 1883, 1 (“Two Mexicans named Pena and Castillo”); San Antonio Light July 12,
1884, 4 (“Bustillos the Mexican”); San Antonio Daily Express, July 3, 1891, 1 (“A Brutal negro … Frank
Houston”).
19 Laredo Times January 31, 1886, 3.
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were routinely more severe for people of color. As provided by the 1860 Texas sodomy statute,
sentences for sodomy could not be “less than five nor more than fifteen years.”20 The majority of
men found guilty for sodomy and who were not designated as racially or ethnically Other in
newspaper accounts were sentenced to five to seven year prison terms. There are exceptions,
however, such as in the cases of Ed Hill and Charles Medis in 1888, and William Green in 1889,
each of whom were sentenced to ten years in the state penitentiary.21 Of these three cases,
Green’s gave no details as to the specifics of the crime, and both Hill’s and Medis’s sentences
were appealed and overturned in 1889.22 Men who were sentenced for convictions of sodomy
and were identified as nonwhite, on the other hand, received longer sentences. Gregario
Ballesteros was sentenced to fifteen years in Webb County in 1880, and “Señor Hernandez” to
ten years in El Paso in 1885.23 Even after the decision in Prindle v. State made convictions for
sodomy more difficult, a “colored” man was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for the
crime in Cuero in 1896.24 In addition, when bond amounts for sodomy arrests were reported,
they reflected this same bias. Men who were not designated as racially or ethnically Other were
often given 250 to 300-dollar bonds while men who were deemed as Other were given 500dollar bonds.25
This tendency for racialization in public and legal accounts of sodomy cases continued
into the twentieth century as well. In Richardson v. State (1906), a sodomy case heard in the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals involving a conviction for an act of bestiality, the original

20 Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, Vol. IV, 1459.
21 Galveston Daily News, July 13, 1888, 8; April 24 1889, 3.
22 Ibid., March 13, 1889, 8; July 12, 1889, 8.
23 Ibid., April 25, 1880, 5; November 10,1885, 2.
24 Ibid., January 10, 1896, 3.
25 Galveston Daily News, August 24, 1886, 3; September 5, 1889, 8; San Antonio Light July 12, 1884, 4;
July 26, 1893, 8 and July 27, 1893, 1.
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judgement was affirmed against a man of color despite the fact that the evidence reviewed in the
appeals case was insufficient for prosecution.26 This decision is striking because the same court
had reversed a judgement on a sodomy case involving an alleged act of bestiality just one year
before Richardson for the reason that the evidence did not justify the conviction.27 Furthermore,
it was alleged that one of the jurors who had found Richardson guilty of sodomy exclaimed that,
“[I]t was proper to convict [the] defendant anyhow, because he had it in his mind to do
something of the kind, and if some white woman had passed he would have raped her.”28 It
seemed that Richardson’s conviction and its affirmation in the appeals court was based on
conceptions about his race.
The above examples of sodomy cases involving people of color highlight how early
constructions of the sodomitical Other centered on conceptions of gender and race in Texas
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition, the white male anxieties that surface in
these newspaper accounts and court records also contain a crucial element of the “rhetoric of
empire.” Jacobson describes this element as the “erotic charge” of the language used and “its
depiction of libidinous primitives in opposition to restrained and properly modest—Christian—
moderns.”29 By using incendiary rhetoric to describe men of color charged with sodomy or their
alleged crime, these accounts constructed a vision of the nonwhite Other as transgressors of
gender and violators of nature. Such a construction coincides with Canaday’s argument that
“perversion itself was seen as a racial characteristic.”30 Other states exhibited the same
tendencies in enforcing their sodomy statutes as well. William N. Eskridge, Jr. notes in his book,
26 Richardson v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. App. 391, (1906).
27 Langford v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. App 561 (1905). Langford was the second appeals case to inscribe this
legal precedent regarding insufficient evidence in a bestiality case, the first being Mullins v. State, 45 Tex. Crim.
App. 465 (1903).
28 Richardson v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. App. 391, 395 (1906).
29 Jacobson, 112.
30 Canaday, 27.
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Dishonorable Passions: Sodomy Laws in America, 1861-2003, that of the sixty-three people
reported to be imprisoned for crimes against nature in the 1880 U.S. Census, over half of them
were males of color and one-third of the remaining white prisoners were foreign born. In fact,
just in Washington D.C. alone, “eighty percent of the people arrested for sodomy between 1881
and 1921 were African Americans.”31 Constructing persons of color as the sodomitical Other
would become overshadowed by a more ambiguous Other in the coming decades, however.
CONSTRUCTING THE “HOMOSEXUAL”
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, an increase in the special medical attention that
was given to human sexual behavior took place amid shifts in theory and growing social
concerns about the subject. The physical and social sciences had been gradually replacing
institutionalized moral governorship over both individuals and society since the seventeenth
century, but as historian Ronald Bayer asserts in his 1981 study Homosexuality and American
Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis, early sexologists “assumed from the faltering religious
tradition the function of serving as a guarantor of social order, substituting illness for that of
sin.”32 Biographer Paul Robinson argues in his 1976 book, The Modernization of Sex: Havelock
Ellis, Alfred Kinsey, William Masters and Virginia Johnson, that this newfound scientific
attention to sexual behavior in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a response to
the Victorian-Era view that “sexual experience” threatened morality and health. By placing
human sexuality outside of “the traditional institutional contexts” of the Victorian Era, “sexual
modernists” exposed the “vexing problem of human sexual psychology: the paradoxical need for

31 Eskridge, 22, 57.
32 Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987), 9.
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both companionship and variety in erotic life.”33 Investigations into the “variety” in human
sexual behavior led to the fascination for, if not the invention of, what Foucault calls “sexual
heterogeneities.” In The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, Foucault labels this era
of sexual discovery as “Scientia Sexualis.” It was “the age of multiplication: a dispersion of
sexualities, a strengthening of their disparate forms, a multiple implantation of ‘perversions.’”34
Of these “perversions,” the medical community gave much of their attention to sexual inversion.
Sexual inversion was ultimately understood by sexologists as a transgression of gender.
British socialist and author Edward Carpenter summed up this important aspect in his 1908
contribution to the field of sexology. In The Intermediate Sex: A Study of Some Transitional
Types of Men and Women, Carpenter argued that, “The only theory—from K. H. Ulrichs to
Havelock Ellis—which has at all held its ground … is that in congenital cases of sex-inversion
there is a mixture of male and female elements in the same person.”35 Sexologists from the
medical field, like German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, British physician Havelock
Ellis, and Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud, all agreed that when a person’s “sexual aim”
could only be satisfied by a “sexual object” that was another person of the same sex, then the
person with the “aberrant” sexual aim possessed an inverted sexual instinct. In other words,
erotic same-sex desire in a man was the result of that man having a female sexual instinct, and
vice versa for the same desire in a woman.36
While there was general agreement among sexologists regarding the gendered nature of
sexual inversion, there was much debate about whether the condition was congenital or acquired.
33 Paul Robinson, The Modernization of Sex: Havelock Ellis, Alfred Kinsey, William Masters and Virginia
Johnson (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 2-3.
34 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 37.
35 Edward Carpenter, The Intermediate Sex: A Study of Some Transitional Types of Men and Women
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921), 66.
36 See Krafft-Ebing, 26; Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Part Four: Sexual Inversion
(New York: Random House, 1942), 42, 289-293; and Freud, 107, 135, 142-144.
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This debate was important in the way that it related to legal proscriptions against certain sexual
behaviors, like the Texas sodomy statute. Krafft-Ebing placed sexual inversion within a
dichotomy of being either acquired or congenital: instead of it being universally one way or the
other, it could instead be conditionally either.37 By the early twentieth century, however, it was
widely accepted among sexologists that it was both. In the words of Ellis, inversion was caused
by “a congenital predisposition as well as an acquired tendency.”38 Regardless of which stance
sexologists took on the matter, they were generally sympathetic to men and women who were
prosecuted for consensual erotic same-sex acts. This sympathy was not initially adopted in the
United States, however.
The Americanization of sexology produced a new type of deviant: the sexual psychopath.
In his article, “The Development of Sexology in the U.S.A. in the Early Twentieth Century,”
Vern L. Bullough claims that European sexologists’ authority over sexuality was challenged by
social hygiene reformers in the U.S. during the Progressive Era because of the lack of attention
given to “the social aspects of sexual behavior.” As a result of the progressives’ influence,
sexology in the U.S. tended to focus “on basic heterosexual problems” which were derived from
progressive concerns for aberrant sexuality’s “association with vice and crime.”39 In this respect,
U.S. sexologists spent more time addressing venereal disease, prostitution, and less often,
sodomy. They saw deviant sexuality as behavior inherent in the lower (and predominately
nonwhite) classes in society. More dangerously, however, these sexologists saw “social disease”
as infectious and they helped to engender fears of contamination in U.S. society.

37 Krafft-Ebing, 79-80.
38 Ellis, 82-84.
39 Bullough, “The Development of Sexology in the USA in the Early Twentieth Century,” in Sexual
Knowledge, Sexual Science: The History of Attitudes to Sexuality, ed. Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 303-306.
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Fears about the spread of sexually deviant behavior in the U.S. became politicized thanks
to efforts by U.S. sexologists, leading to a nationwide hysteria. In her 1987 article, “Uncontrolled
Desires: The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960,” historian Estelle B. Freedman
explores how the “violent, male, sexual criminal” was constructed by state and psychiatric
authorities in the U.S. in response to “sex crime panics” that began in the 1930s.40 These
“panics” derived from the popularization of a superficial interpretation of Freud’s arrested sexual
development theory. Instead of surmising that sexual inversion was a natural, childhood step in
human psychosexual development and that adult “homosexuals” were trapped in that state, both
psychiatrists and laymen in the U.S. believed that twentieth-century “homosexuals” were
naturally prone to violent, sexual attacks on children. This fear was influenced by the history of
criminal sodomy cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many of which were
based on coerced sexual acts against children. This was especially the case in Texas. Even with
the ambiguous wording in the 1860 sodomy statute, charges of sodomy were still used to
prosecute men who perpetuated such acts during the early- to mid-twentieth century. Cases were
brought against Ellis Jackson in 1906, George Pettit in 1929, Michael Crowley and Lonnie
Gidcumb in 1933, and Refugio Garcia and Elmer Joe Meckel in 1940 for committing “sodomy”
with boys under the age of 18.41 The predatory image of the twentieth century homosexual would
last for decades, feeding old fears of contamination among youths in the United States.
There were even more examples of what Americans called sexual psychopaths in Texas
immediately following the 1943 revision to the state sodomy statute. In 1944, a merchant seaman
named Almond Bodary was charged with sodomy for molesting several young girls in the
40 Estelle B. Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires: The Response to the Sexual Psychopath,” Journal of
American History 74 (1987): 88.
41 Port Arthur News, June 19, 1929, 11; January 16, 1933, 2; Gidcumb v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. App. 395
(1935), Valley Star Monitor Herald, February 18, 1940, 10; April 14, 1940, 3. There were several other criminal
cases of sodomy reported in Texas newspapers during this time, but many of them failed to give details of the crime.
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Galveston area. He pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to five years in the state
penitentiary.42 The next year, J. P. Rayborough pled guilty to having “practiced with young
Lubbock boys what the law calls the ‘abominable and detestable crime against nature,’ sodomy.”
Upon Rayborough’s sentencing, the presiding Judge G.V. Pardue claimed, “I’d a lot rather see
you hanged to one of those elm trees out on the lawn.”43 An important distinction must be made
between the response to the sexual psychopath in Texas and the response elsewhere in the U.S.
Texas was not one of the twenty nine states to pass sexual psychopath statutes, “under which
courts committed individuals charged with or convicted of certain crimes, typically sex offenses,
to psychiatric institutions” instead of penitentiaries. Legal historian Marie-Amelie George claims
in her 2015 article, “The Harmless Psychopath: Legal Debates Promoting the Decriminalization
of Sodomy in the United States,” that sexual psychopath statutes “treated offenders as patients
instead of criminals,” but in Texas, sodomy was interpreted as a willful act to harm, and such
offenses could only find justice in a prison sentence.44 Such was the case in the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals decision in Grubbs v. State (1940). The appellant had motioned for a new trial
following his conviction for the crime of sodomy based on the development of new evidence in
his favor. Basically, the appellant had been able to procure sworn statements from family and
community members that he was insane and, as such, had no distinctive knowledge between
right and wrong. The court, however, ruled that they “would not be justified in reversing this
case,” and the appellant continued his ten year prison sentence.45

42.Galveston Daily News, March 15, 1944, 9.
43 Lubbock Morning Avalanche, July 24, 1945, 12.
44 Marie-Amelie George, “The Harmless Psychopath: Legal Debates promoting the Decriminalization of
Sodomy in the United States,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 24.2 (2015): 226-227.
45 Grubbs v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. App. 507 (1940).
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But why was the nature of the sexual psychopath perceived so differently in Texas?
While discussing a new sex crime bill in 1950, District Attorney Bob Long noted how a number
of doctors believed that surgery could “cure” child molesters and other sex offenders, but he
concluded that “you can’t stop a homosexual that way.”46 Freedman claims that the construction
of the sexual psychopath was dependent upon “three converging trends”:
First, as courts and prisons became important arenas into which American psychiatry
expanded beyond its earlier base in state mental hospitals, the recently established
specialization of forensic psychiatry sought new explanations for criminal behavior.
Second, the social stresses of the Depression drew attention to the problems of male
deviance. Third, the social scientific study of sexuality became respectable, and the
influence of psychoanalytic theories on American psychiatry during the 1930s provided
an intellectual base for a sexual theory of crime.47
As this construction relates to Texas, however, I argue that gender played a far more crucial role.
As discussed above, the state of Texas was itself a gendered space, and such an attribution
depended on the fixity of a gender binary. If homosexuality was the product of a dangerous
glitch in nature, as it was proposed to be by sexologists, then the system that supported state
projects on a gendered basis would become fallible. If such a view was accepted, then state
control over bodies and behavior could be relinquished. That view was rejected in Texas.
The paradox of ambiguity in the 1860 Texas sodomy statute was resolved in the creation
of the 1943 statute. The separate acts which constituted the crime of sodomy were put into
clearer terms, thus ending the tendency of courts having to dismiss unprosecutable charges or
overturn previous convictions. But one element of the first statute’s ambiguity was carried on in
its revision: While the crime of sodomy was specific, the criminal who committed the act was
dangerously ambiguous. Furthermore, the ambiguity left over in the 1943 statute compounded
with the multifariousness of the different acts that could constitute an act of sodomy created a
46 El Paso Herald Post, February 22, 1950, 2. The report did not specify what type of surgery the board of
lawyers was discussing, but the context of the discussion seems to relate to castration.
47 Freedman, 88.
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new sense of obsession over not just who could be marked as the sodomitical Other, but what
crimes that individual or group was capable of committing. Eskridge explains that, “While
hysteria creates an underclass that is animalistic and disgusting, obsession understands its objects
as contagious or predatory, but often hidden, which means they must be hunted out.”48 With
homosexuality being linked to sodomy and its long legacy of confusion, gay men were ascribed a
nefarious status that represented a multifarious transgression against a number of social
constructions. The “homosexual” defied widely accepted understandings of gender, sex, and
even citizenship, and as such, the sodomitical Other was easily linked to other perceived threats
to the natural order.
CONFLATION AND CONFLICT
There was a gradual shift in the ways that human bodies were surveilled, disciplined, and
controlled during the early- to mid-twentieth century, and the end of World War Two marked its
apex. Consuming fears of communist infiltration and of the consequences that would follow
filled U.S. society with fear at this time, and the equally pervasive duty to eradicate the specter of
communism went beyond the legal reach of national, state, and local governments. Cold War
historian Stephen J. Whitfield argues that this duty fell on everyone, including “legislators and
judges, union officials and movie studio bosses, policemen and generals, university presidents
and corporation executives, clergymen and journalists, Republicans and Democrats,
conservatives and liberals.”49 Michel Foucault suggests through his theory of panopticism that
surveillance and discipline are constructed by institutions of power to be self-imposed by the
individual subject. He explains in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison that, “He who

48 Eskridge, 29.
49 Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991),
1.
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is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints
of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own
subjection.”50 In the midst of Cold War hysteria in the U.S., however, the practice of surveillance
and discipline expanded beyond the self to the community, from panopticism to synopticism.
Policing bodies was no longer restricted to the law in this new realm of scrutiny and the federal
government propagated this fact, calling on all U.S. citizens to diligently root out the communist
anticitizen.
One of the most dangerous characteristics of the new political Other in the mid-twentieth
century was that, similar to the recently constructed sodomitical Other, their subversion was
often not outwardly identifiable. This created “ideological and rhetorical linkages between
political subversion and sexual perversion” according to twentieth-century U.S. historian Stacy
Braukman, resulting in increased legal and public attention to the rise in “secret” gay and lesbian
“communities.”51 The federal response to this new threat was solidified in executive orders from
Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the McCarren-Walter Act, and most
publicly, in U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anticommunist (and tangentially antihomosexual)
crusade. The executive orders excluded “homosexuals” from federal and military employment
and the McCarren-Walter Act prohibited them from even entering the country, together noting
that sexual deviance was a valid reason for such exclusion.52 The specter of McCarthyism led to
the outing of federal employees, school teachers and university professors, costing them their
jobs and standing in their respective communities. The federal stance against homosexuality was
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Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 202-203.
51 Stacy Braukman, Communists and Perverts under the Palms: The Johns Committee in Florida, 19561965 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 10.
52 Ibid., 88-99; Canaday, 21.

61

not only mirrored in sodomy arrests, but community members also took part in the exclusion of
the sodomitical Other. The new obsession had spread all over the nation—from government
offices, to school campuses, to living rooms—and as it was conflated with fears of Communist
infiltration during the Cold War, it challenged the concept of privacy as a fundamental right to
American individualism.
The ambiguous criminality of the sodomitical Other was constructed through many
sodomy cases across the U.S. following World War II, and extensive attention was given to them
in Texas newspapers. One such case involving a French artist living in Atlanta became a national
spectacle in 1947. Paul Rene Refoule was detained by county police after his American socialite
wife, Peggy, was mysteriously slain on May 14. After several interrogations, some of which
Refoule would later claim involved torture, detectives ended up arresting the artist for sodomy
based on incriminating information that had been gathered during questioning. Refoule had
allegedly confessed to carrying on several extramarital affairs with women before his wife’s
death, and among the sexual acts committed in those affairs were acts which the police
considered to violate the Georgia sodomy statute. After months of litigation in both the criminal
sodomy case and a lawsuit filed by Refoule against the police, the charges were dropped on
November 24.53 Despite the fact that Refoule was able to avoid conviction, the heightened
publicity surrounding his case embodied him as the foreigner, the sexual deviate, the
encroaching inevitability of contagion that U.S. citizens needed to protect their families and
themselves from. While the legal system was unable to secure a victory against that threat in
Refoule’s case, it would find some success the following year in Missouri.

53 Amarillo Daily News, June 16, 1947, 2; June 18, 1947, 8; August 1, 1947, 13; November 25, 1947, 8.

62

On May 27, 1948 E.K. Johnston, a journalism professor at the University of Missouri,
and two other men were arrested on “morals charges” in Columbia, MO. This case was different
from Refoule’s in that it involved allegations of homosexuality. The Amarillo Daily News
reported that these men were involved in a “homosexual ring” which was described in “a nearfantastic story of ‘mad parties’ at Johnston’s apartment and at a cabin near Salem, Mo., in which
as many as 30 members of the ‘ring’ gathered to boast of conquests and to indulge in
homosexual practices.” Nearly a year later, Johnston, another university professor, a university
student, and two other men pled guilty to sodomy charges and were each sentenced to four years
of probation. Had it not been for the testimony of Johnston’s colleague Dr. Edwin F. Gildes, who
claimed that he was not a “menace to society,” the men would have been sentenced to prison
instead. Despite escaping a prison sentence, Johnston was still subject to the denouement of
synopticism, losing his position at the university and being driven out of his community.54
Johnston’s case was proof that the “homosexual” had become the quintessential sexual deviate, a
legitimate criminal who deserved some sort of punishment, and a necessary target for scrutiny in
the public eye.
Homosexuality became a target for legal and public scrutiny in Texas also, requiring
meticulous investigation and pursuit by law enforcement. A moral crusade against the perceived
threat took place in the border city of El Paso in 1956. Coverage of the first set of arrests in the
“morals drive” was provided in the El Paso Herald-Post on March 22. Two separate articles in
the newspaper gave incendiary reports concerning the six men who were involved in “a ‘wellorganized ring’ of local homosexuals.” One of the articles even touted that the “ring” could
conceivably have been comprised of over 200 men, including civilians and servicemen from Fort

54 Ibid., May 28, 1948, 28; November 18, 1948, 6; January 7, 1949, 11.
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Bliss and Biggs Air Force Base.55 After dozens of arrests and two grand jury investigations,
however, only five indictments were made. The turning point of the investigation came when
accusations against Raymond B. Charney led to his arrest and termination from his job as a
newscaster for the local KELP radio station. A month after his arrest one of Charney’s two
teenage accusers rescinded their testimony, and the case was dismissed. Still, the crusade left an
impression that homosexuality was both deserving of legal and public scrutiny as well as a cause
for exclusion.
The initial arrests in El Paso came after an investigation had been launched by a county
grand jury and city police in January. The investigation was based on a complaint that had been
filed in November of the previous year against a man named Armando Lujan, accusing him of a
“moral offense,” and including the name of a serviceman from Biggs Air Force Base. After the
months-long investigation in which “the grand jury talked with more than 20 airmen, soldiers,
transients, and permanent residents of El Paso,”56 police finally raided a home in March 1956
where they found Lujan and five other men with “women’s clothing and photographic
equipment.”57 While there is no evidence to suggest that the six men were engaged in any sexual
activity during the arrest, they were each charged with sodomy and four of the men, including
Lujan, were released within a day on one thousand dollar bonds. There is no indication of why
one of the men, Alva T. Payne, was held at the El Paso County Jail until July 3, but the other
man who was not immediately released, William E. Scripps, was concurrently charged for

55 El Paso Herald Post, March 22, 1956, 5, 28.
56 Ibid., September 24, 1956, 2. Details of the investigation of Armando Lujan were published after his
sentencing in September.
57 Ibid., March 22, 1956, 28.
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possession of narcotics, convicted on both charges five months later, and transferred to a
penitentiary on September 5.58
The police investigation and the initial arrests closely resembled a case that took place in
Waco, TX three years earlier. The Waco story made the front page of the Lubbock Evening
Journal on April 13, 1953. According to the newspaper, a “homosexual convention” which
included a “mock wedding” was interrupted by local police, and sixty-three men were arrested.
Like the “ring” raided by El Paso police three years later, several of the men arrested in Waco
were found “dressed in women’s apparel, including heavy make up, high heel shoes, evening
gowns and spring hats.”59 In addition to this similarity, the raid in Waco followed an extensive
investigation that dated back at least three months before arrests were made. One significant
difference between the cases was the type of charges filed against the arrested men. While the
initial arrests in El Paso were made on charges of sodomy with one thousand dollar bonds, the
arrests in Waco were made on charges of vagrancy with mere twenty five dollar bonds. As the
1956 crusade in El Paso continued, several of the dozens more arrested were also charged with
vagrancy instead of sodomy. Vagrancy was a catchall term that could be used in arrests for
different types of deviant behavior, sexual or not. In fact, the most common charge found in the
1956 El Paso County Jail register was for vagrancy. Even two El Paso fortune tellers ended up
pleading guilty to charges of vagrancy on August 3, 1956, after being arrested only days earlier.
They each paid a ten dollar fine and court costs.60 As for men who were arrested for engaging in
erotic same-sex acts and charged with vagrancy, legal scholar Dale Carpenter notes how they
“routinely pleaded guilty to the offense, paid whatever fine was imposed, and hushed up about

58 El Paso County Jail Records, January to July 1956.
59 Lubbock Evening Journal, April 13, 1953, 1, 10.
60 El Paso Herald-Post, August 3, 1956, 1.
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their convictions.”61 Arrests for vagrancy mimic the ambiguity of the 1860 sodomy statute and
how it was used to target undesirable Others. What is most telling about the raids in Waco and El
Paso, however, is how gender transgression was seen as the defining characteristic of the
“homosexual.”
As the above cases show, a foreign artist, a university professor, a radio newscaster—
anyone—had the potential of being the sodomitical Other; even a person that someone would
least expect. Such was the case in a debate that unfolded in the “Ask Mrs. Carroll” column of the
El Paso Herald Post in the summer of 1952. Responding to a wife and mother who had written
to the paper for advice concerning her husband coming out to her as a homosexual, Mrs. Carroll
cited the national publicity surrounding the routing out of homosexuals from the federal
government and all but demanded that the woman leave and divorce her husband at once. Two
weeks later, the paper published an anonymous response to Mrs. Carroll’s advice which claimed
that homosexuality was “just a disease that can be overcome like any other illness if you have the
right treatment” and urged the woman to stay with her husband. Mrs. Carroll’s return was as
rigid as her initial response, claiming that homosexuals were “unfortunate and often, evil,
persons who try to blight the innocent,” and that they “are to be pitied, but they are not to be
lived with by normal women rearing normal children.”62 This snippet of someone’s private life
not only exemplifies the reach of the state-constructed sodomitical Other, but it also highlights
how that construction was created at the intersection of legal perspectives and medical debates
on homosexuality. More importantly, however, Mrs. Carroll’s response conveys another grave
concern regarding contamination at the time: the protection of children from the sexual predator.

61 Carpenter, 14.
62 Ibid., July 23, 1952, 24; August 5, 1952, 18.
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals alone heard a total of twenty-four cases about acts
of sodomy committed against children between 1944 and 1969, with almost half taking place
between 1950 and 1955, and the majority of which giving explicit details for the acts involved.63
Stacy Braukman argues that sexual crimes committed against minors and their association with
sodomy were “the most damning stereotypes of homosexuals” in this period, but it was the
intersection of sodomy’s association with homosexuality, sexual psychopathy, child molestation,
and the imminent threat to national security that gave the construction of the sodomitical Other
its dynamism in the 1950s and 1960s.64 In addition to the sodomy cases dealing with criminal
acts against minors, there were a total of forty other cases heard in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals during this time that made at least the mention, if not the explicit description of
consensual, violent, or incestual acts of sodomy. Expanding on anthropologist James C. Scott’s
assertion that, “States are powerful … because they simplify complex social facts into a set of
categories that are easily ‘legible,’” Canaday contends that “state practices make a variety of
gender codes and sexual behaviors legible as homosexuality.” Caught within this explosion of
discourse surrounding sodomy and the associated conceptual milieu of un-Americanism, the
“homosexual” was reimagined “in law and policy … as the anticitizen.”65

63 Head v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. App. 594 (1944); Furstonburg v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. App. 638 (1945);
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The construction of the mid twentieth-century sodomitical Other and its conception as the
antithesis to citizenship in the U.S. was rooted in a contorted interpretation of privacy that was
influenced by Cold War fears. Given the perceived nature of the criminal acts perpetrated by the
homosexual anticitizen and the alleged danger that they posed, a thin line was drawn between
privacy and secrecy. This led to the involvement of both police and the public in the surveillance
and discipline of the sodomitical Other. Men didn’t have to be caught in the act of sodomy to be
arrested, and they didn’t have to be convicted in court to be excluded by their respective
communities. According to Stacy Braukman, the fear of “the homosexual who could pass for
straight—who, in the role of teacher, minister, Boy Scout Troop leader, or camp counselor,
would never raise suspicions among the parents of his or her youthful targets” led to an obsessive
synopticism that breached the walls between citizen and government.66 Citizenship’s right to
privacy was valid only if that personal realm didn’t envelop a sexual status that posed a danger to
children or, worse yet, national security. In other words, privacy was for citizens whereas secrecy
was for anticitizens. Ultimately, however, it would be this intrusion into the realm of privacy that
would strip the 1943 Texas sodomy statute of its power.
FROM SODOMY TO HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT
Despite the new language in the 1943 Texas sodomy statute and its role in the making of
the mid twentieth-century sodomitical Other, the enforcement of the statute, which depended on
a malleable application of the right to privacy, was rendered legally problematic in 1970, leading
to legislative intervention in 1973. The statute was ruled unconstitutional by a federal district
court in Buchanan et al. v. Batchelor et al. (1970). The original plaintiff in the case, Alvin
Buchanan, was a gay man who had been arrested on two occasions for committing consensual
66 Braukman, 114.
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acts of sodomy in a Dallas public restroom. Buchanan’s contestation of the constitutionality of
the 1943 Texas sodomy statute was soon supported by three other individuals as it reached the
federal court, but in a different way. The new plaintiffs claimed that the sodomy statute
encroached upon their right to privacy by instilling a fear of “prosecution for the commission of
private acts described as sodomy.”67 Just as the 1860 Texas sodomy statute entered into an era of
contestation in the early twentieth century, its replacement was questioned based on the language
it used to target a state-constructed ambiguous criminal.
The right to privacy has been interpreted and inscribed by the U.S. Supreme Court as an
individual’s right to personal choice in relation to their own life, liberty, or property without the
intrusion of any governmental agency. This interpretation dates as far back as the late nineteenth
century, when the Court ruled in Boyd v. United States (1886) to protect “the sanctity of a man’s
home and the privacies of life” against unwarranted search and seizure.68 This protection of
privacy was extended to matters of intimacy almost a century later in Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965), an appeal to the conviction of two medical professionals who were engaged in advising
and distributing contraceptive materials to married couples in Connecticut. The court ruled that
such a criminal statute was an unconstitutional affront to the right to privacy of married couples,
citing the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the U.S. Constitution.69 The Dallas
federal court cited the Griswold decision in striking down the 1943 Texas sodomy statute on the
grounds that it was an “unconstitutional overbreadth insofar as it reaches the private, consensual
acts of married couples.”70 The decision did not inscribe the same right to privacy for the original

67 Buchanan et al. v. Batchelor et al., 308 F. Supp. 729, 730 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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appellant, however. It rather solidified the divide between heterosexual and homosexual while
surreptitiously giving state lawmakers a precedence for constructing a more explicit definition of
the twentieth century sodomitical Other.
As part of a recodification of the Texas penal code in 1973, the Texas Legislature
removed the 1943 sodomy statute entirely, and in its place provided a non-punitive definition for
“deviate sexual intercourse.” The new definition excluded bestiality and child molestation,
stating that, “Deviate sexual intercourse means: (A) any contact between any part of the genitals
of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or
the anus of another person with an object.”71 The new sodomitical Other was reified in legal
language in Section 21.06 of the revised penal code, however, which labeled “homosexual
conduct,” or “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex,” as a criminal
sexual offense.72 In the decades that followed, the 1973 Texas homosexual conduct statute
became the cornerstone for anti-gay legislation in the state. One example can be seen in the 1991
decision to amend the Texas Health and Safety Code to read: “Course materials and instruction
relating to sexual education or sexually transmitted diseases should include…[an] emphasis,
provided in a factual manner and from a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a
lifestyle acceptable to the general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under
Section 21.06, Penal Code.”73 The Texas Legislature sought to inscribe the sodomitical Other not
just in the legal language within the state penal code, but also in state-funded classrooms.
Ultimately, however, the statute was ruled unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the
U.S. Supreme Court case that struck down all of the homosexual conduct and sodomy statutes in
Crim. App. 1971), but the U.S. Supreme Court extended the right to privacy to unmarried couples a year later in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), thus increasing the potential for further contestation of the Texas law.
71 Texas Penal Code Annotated §21.011 (Vernon 2011).
72 Texas Penal Code Annotated §21.06(a) (Vernon 2011).
73 Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated § 85.007(b), and § 163.002 (Vernon 2010).

70

the country. Still, the Supreme Court was unable to erase the near 150 year-long legacy of
confusion that had surrounded the term, the crime, and the status of sodomy in Texas.

Gender, race, and sexuality were all social constructions which were used to define the
parameters of citizenship and Otherness in Texas during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The state of Texas itself was constructed through discourse as a gendered space from its
inception as a U.S. state, complete with racial boundaries and a natural code of sexual conduct.
The earliest sodomitical Other in Texas was made at the intersection of this trifecta and the
legacy of confusion surrounding sodomy. The nonwhite Other was conceived as a natural
harbinger of sodomitical behavior and duly targeted by the ambiguous 1860 sodomy statute. The
introduction of new ideas about sexuality—or more specifically, homosexuality—into the state’s
consciousness during the early- to mid-twentieth century led to the transformation of a new,
more ambiguous sodomitical Other. While the 1943 sodomy statute possessed the appropriate
language to warrant the investigation, arrest, and public prosecution of such an individual, it was
flawed in that its target was still too broad. By 1973, however, Texas legislators were able to
refine their discursive technique of power and exclusively target gays and lesbians in the state.
The construction of the sodomitical Other was thus a political and historically contingent process
which reflects the broader legal system of Othering undesirable elements which were antithetical
to the interests of those who controlled it.
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Conclusion
[O]nly steers and queers come from Texas, Private Cowboy, and you don’t much look like a steer
to me so that kinda narrows it down.
Full Metal Jacket, 1987

I drew the title of this thesis from Stanley Kubrik’s 1987 cult classic film Full Metal
Jacket for several reasons. The movie follows a group of U.S. Marines through basic training and
the battlefield during the Vietnam War and it encapsulates both the power and limits of
hypermasculinity. The line, “only steers and queers come from Texas” is emblematic of this
dichotomy, spoken (or rather, yelled) by a hypermasculine drill instructor hellbent on breaking
down the psyche of his marines in training, to convince them that they are outsiders, degenerates,
unworthy of membership in the marine corps. This initial Otherness during basic training
provides the cornerstone of an important binary, however, in which the new marines’ Otherness
is set opposite to the fully trained, ready-for-combat soldiers. This thesis also constructs one side
of an exclusive/inclusive binary, positing the sodomitical Other at the side which is opposite to
citizenship in the U.S. But there are more uses for this iconic phrase, “[O]nly steers and queers
come from Texas.”
The first time I heard this phrase was when I was fourteen years old, not from watching
Full Metal Jacket (I saw the film a few years afterward), but from my father—a retired U.S.
Army Staff Sergeant—in a candid conversation. He asked me if I had ever heard the phrase
before and, despite my negative reply, he offered what he thought was the perfect response
should I ever be on the receiving end of the accusation: “If anyone ever asks you if you’re a steer
or queer, you say, ‘Bend over so you can feel my bullhorn.’” While on one hand this response is
reflective of crass, hypermasculine heteronormativity meant to be funny in ritual male bonding,
it presents on the other hand an important facet of the construction of the sodomitical Other.
“Steers” and “queers” are linked within a sodomitical discourse that posits bestiality and
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homosexuality as the same (and seemingly negative) behavior. Of course, this was not a
revelation I had at fourteen years old, but that interaction I had with my father has come to mind
often throughout the process of conducting research for this project and it is salient to my
concluding remarks.
The phrase, “[O]nly steers and queers come from Texas” is indeed iconic: it is embedded
in the cultural consciousness of the U.S. This is evident in the more than forty-six million dollar
total domestic gross revenue of Full Metal Jacket and the near 130 million dollars made from the
1982 film An Officer and a Gentleman, which also used the phrase. It is evident in smirks on the
faces of literally everyone who has heard me recite this thesis title. And it is evident in candid,
hypermasculine jokes between fathers and their fourteen year-old sons. What is not so evident,
however, is that the underlying messages in this iconic phrase about Otherness and the confused
nature of sodomy are also prevalent in U.S. culture, even if only at a subconscious level. That is
the nature of sodomitical discourse: it is both explicit and implicit at the same time and, much
like the 1973 Texas homosexual conduct statute, it is still active today.

The sodomitical discourse outlined in this thesis has deep roots. The creation and
enforcement of the 1860 Texas sodomy statute can only be understood in the context of the
history of sodomy that precedes it. That history produced a legacy of confusion created by a
multiplicity of discourses surrounding the ways in which sodomy was conceived. The ambiguity
employed in sodomy proscriptions from the medieval to early modern periods produced a
limitless realm of social control through those proscriptions’ enforcement by targeting and
excluding different sorts of people for different sorts of crimes. Through time, however, the still
ambiguous definition of sodomy was interpreted more narrowly as being a crime of a sexual
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nature, and its incorporation into state penal codes in the United States along with its
enforcement reflected the same contraction. But the power potential for the control of human
bodies remained embedded in the discursive space that was left open for interpretation.
Interpreting the term, act, and crime of sodomy in Texas was a contentious endeavor
during the nineteenth century. The 1860 Texas sodomy statute gave no explicit definition for
what constituted an act of sodomy other than calling it a “crime against nature” committed with
“mankind or beast.” The task of interpreting both the act and criminal nature of sodomy was left
to state law enforcement and courts, but even then, those individuals were wary to put their
interpretations into clear and specific words. This lack of clarity in the language used in both the
penal code and the court decisions that abstained from naming the risqué details rendered the
1860 Texas sodomy statute almost unenforceable. Still, there are at least two acts which can be
excavated from the written record that show how sodomy was conceived of in Texas before
1893. The first of these acts, which was most commonly prosecuted in Texas courts, was
bestiality. The second of these acts was fellatio, but unlike bestiality, such an act was eventually
deemed unprosecutable due to the ambiguous language used in the sodomy statute. With these
two acts, the criminal nature of sodomy could be seen as a form of sexual violence, but not
without complication. Whereas the inscription of other crimes that were designated as sexually
violent into the Texas penal code portrayed a very clear picture of a victim and aggressor,
sodomy did not. Moreover, victims of sexual violence were concretely defined as female, but an
act of sodomy carried no such distinction. Given the available records from nineteenth-century
sodomy cases in Texas, there were typically two types of genderless victims of sodomy: those
who witnessed the crime and children.
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Sodomy was redefined in Texas during the twentieth century through a shift in the
discourse surrounding the act. Through the decisions in several court cases, sodomy was
explicitly inscribed in the legal record as the penile penetration of the anus or mouth of a human
being or animal and any sexual act committed upon a minor. Despite calls from judges in the
state, however, this specificity was not resounded in any legislative action to revise the 1860
sodomy statute. As such, the statute remained practically unenforceable until 1943. Following a
dramatic increase in the number of sodomy arrests in Texas as well as the amount of sodomy
convictions being overturned in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, legislators reacted by
bypassing the state constitution to enact a new sodomy statute in 1943. This did not dispel the
legacy of confusion that had surrounded the term, act, and crime of sodomy for centuries,
however. It rather perpetuated the discursive multiplicity that lay at the heart of that legacy, and
with it, a potential for the State construction of Otherness and its imposition on human bodies.
Constructing the sodomitical Other in Texas during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries was dependent upon the ambiguity and confusion that was inherent in the state’s legal
proscriptions against sodomy. The ambiguously worded 1860 sodomy statute was easily pliable
with how “unnature” was conceptualized in a southern state given over to social constructions
rooted in fixed ideas about a gender binary, a racial hierarchy, and appropriate sexual behavior.
As such, the already existing construction of the nonwhite Other and its association with a
predilection to deviant behavior led to a racial disparity in the enforcement of the 1860 sodomy
statute during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The number of arrests, bond
amounts, and the severity of punishments for men of color accused of sodomy far outweighed
those for white men. From its inception, the proscription of sodomy in Texas was most powerful
in a discursive context wherein the concept of “unnature” intersected with other epistemic
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anxieties regarding the vitality of white supremacy. But this discursive intersection which
racialized the sodomitical Other and its resulting hysteria were both displaced by the mid
twentieth century. The introduction of genderless sodomy victims, decreasingly racialized sexual
psychopaths, more specific definitions of sodomitical acts in the 1943 sodomy statute, and fears
about psychological and political contamination into this milieu of social constructions produced
a new sodomitical Other in Texas.
The multifarious discourse that had surrounded sodomy in Texas since the creation of the
state’s first sodomy statute in 1860 and onto the creation of the 1943 replacement statute
converged upon the “homosexual” body in the post-World War Two era. The new “homosexual”
was perceived to transgress gender, commit unnatural sexual acts with the same sex as well as
with animals, threaten national security, and prey on innocent children, infecting them with the
same tendencies, all at once. This prolific intersection produced a sodomitical Other that was the
multifarious embodiment of anticitizenship in the U.S. The most disturbing characteristic of the
new construction, however, was the level of secrecy in which the sodomitical Other could
operate. While the enforcement of the 1943 Texas sodomy statute did not ubiquitously lead to
the incarceration of gay men or lesbians, it did lead to the public ostracization of these
individuals which inhibited the legitimacy of their place in society. The ambiguous crime had
evolved into the ambiguous criminal and the era of hysteria surrounding the sodomitical Other
had morphed into one of public obsession. But when the vehicle of that obsession in Texas—the
1943 Texas sodomy statute—encroached upon the legitimacy of private heterosexual relations in
1970, a call for a legally defined division between heterosexuality and homosexuality came from
a Texas federal court and was answered by state lawmakers in the creation of the 1973 Texas
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homosexual conduct statute. Sexuality had become a marker of status that had gone far beyond
earlier postulations of sexologists, and homosexual status became an explicit crime in Texas.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in Lawrence v. Texas does not mark the end of
this history. Sodomy and homosexual conduct statutes still exist within state penal codes in the
U.S. and, to varying degrees, they are still enforced. Moreover, legislators still use the familiar
sodomitical discourse to justify anti-gay legislation. This discourse is used to target more than
just gay men and lesbians, demonizing transgender individuals and other members of the
LGBTQI community. It is important to recognize, however, that invoking the “ancient roots” of
sodomy prohibition in this maelstrom of prejudice is baseless and contrived. The alignment of
sodomy with homosexuality (let alone with race or gender) extends from a political project to
define citizenship by juxtaposing an imagined target for exclusion with it. It is a fraudulent
process of Othering that infects not just the law in the U.S., but U.S. culture as well.
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